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Soviet Army Paper on Duplicitous Nature of SDI Policy

52001634b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jul 87 p 3

[Article by Lt Col V. Nikanorov: "The 'Stellar' Ambitions of the Militarists"]

[Text] SDI: Not a Shield, But a Nuclear Sword... Why They are Hurrying in Washington... An Alternative to Space Madness

"The threat of force or the use of force, or any other hostile actions, or threat of hostile actions on the moon are prohibited..." At first glance it may seem that this is a phrase from a book of science fiction. Nevertheless, it is taken from an entirely real UN document, approved almost a decade ago. Having entered the space age, mankind has moved out beyond the boundaries of our planet. Along with this, the anxieties and concerns of earthlings have taken on a new space dimension. This involves especially concern about peace and the survival of mankind. Anxieties are growing that the exploitation of space not turn into a universal catastrophe for the people of the earth.

This anxiety is no accident. The American militarists are looking at the stars with longing. They seriously count on using space as a rung to the pedestal of world domination. And they are not only counting on it, but are already undertaking specific and very dangerous steps toward their illusory goal. At a meeting with journalists held a few days ago R. Sims, representative of the U. S. Department of Defense, stated that the council on Pentagon purchases is ready to sanction the shift of all or part of the SDI program to the state of "demonstration and assessment." If this step is taken it can be assessed as nothing other than a deviation from the ABM Treaty. And this is not the only fact that confirms the persistent aspiration of the American militarists toward space.

In the more than four years since U. S. President Reagan gave his sadly famous "Star" speech, the concept of the "strategic defense initiative" has turned into the central point of Washington's foreign policy strategy. It reflects the policy of providing U. S. military superiority over the USSR, and in general the superiority of capitalism over socialism.

Representatives of the U. S. military-industrial complex are among the ardent adherents of the "strategic defense initiative." This is entirely explainable: "Star" orders promise the monopolies truly cosmic profits. According to the calculations of specialists, implementation of the plans for the militarization of space will require expenditures of \$1 trillion. For purposes of comparison, the entire program to put a man on the moon cost the U. S. approximately \$80 billion. And the main suppliers of the U. S. military department have scented the smell of easy

profit. Characteristically, immediately after Reagan proclaimed the "strategic defense initiative" the stock of the Lockheed Company jumped 11 points, that of Martin-Marietta jumped 8 points and that of McDonnell-Douglas jumped 7 points.

Implementation of SDI according to the plan proclaimed by the advocates of this program must provide the technical capability to solve the following task:

- timely detection of the launch of enemy missiles and notification of elements of an anti-missile defense system of this fact;
- tracking missiles on their flight trajectory to determine their position in time and space;
- determination of the nature of the threat and disclosure of false targets to ensure effective distribution of the means of intercept;
- intercept and elimination of ballistic missiles in all phases of their trajectory: acceleration, post-acceleration, sustained and final;
- assessment and monitoring the results of actions.

It is intended that the tasks envisioned within the framework of SDI will be solved through the use of two main categories of weapons: directed energy weapons (various high energy space and ground based lasers, as well as emitters of bundles of neutral particles and electrons), and high kinetic energy weapons (various space and ground based military systems intended to accomplish mechanical destruction of the missiles or warheads). A super-powerful and super-fast computer is assigned the role of coordinator of the entire gigantic SDI structure.

The new "American dream" looks about like this. And, although science and technology are not yet able to realize many of its elements, the "strategic defense initiative" is advertised intensively, and portrayed as a panacea against any missile threat.

The strategists of "Star Wars" place special reliance, at least publicly, on the supposedly "purely defensive" nature of SDI. In fact, everything is not quite this way, rather it is not at all this way.

First we note that, as they actively work on creating a "space shield," American strategists in no way intend to let go of the nuclear missile sword. The U. S. President spoke about this in his speech in spring 1983: "We must," he said, discussing the difficulties of implementing SDI, "inevitably retain our nuclear deterrence forces and a reliable capability for flexible response." This was stated still more frankly in the Pentagon "Defense Directive for Fiscal Years 1984-1988." This official document of the U. S. military department states plainly that the

United States must be prepared "to wage war effectively" from space. For this purpose space systems will be created to "move forces to space and from space."

It is very important that the strike weapon that the Pentagon intends to place in space within the SDI framework will be suitable not only to "destroy enemy missiles," but also to destroy ground targets. G. Razer, Vice President of the (Keyman Aerospace) Corporation, indicates authoritatively: "The system of military space stations called upon to stop a nuclear attack, in addition, possibly will have the capability to attack selected targets in space, in the atmosphere and on the surface of the earth." Other specialists also adhere to this point of view. As possible "targets" they named tankers, oil storage facilities, and power stations. Powerful lasers may be used to set forests ablaze and cause fires in cities... thus, the version about the "purely defensive purpose" of space weapons is totally unraveling.

Nor will assertions that SDI is supposedly "abolishing" nuclear weapons, and making them "obsolete," withstand any criticism. To the contrary, attempts to create space strike weapons not only whip up the nuclear arms race on earth, but also lead to shifting it into near-earth space. The system of space anti-missile defense itself provides for the active use of nuclear elements — x-ray lasers with nuclear pumping, for example. Nuclear explosions at a range in Nevada are now being carried out to develop precisely such SDI elements.

For several years already the United States has been persistently carrying out work aimed at implementing the "strategic defense initiative." In a number of directions, judging by press reports, certain successes have been achieved; however, specialists state that on the whole there has been no breakthrough. To the contrary, the ephemeral nature of the concocted "star" shield is being ever more clearly sketched. Even Gen Abrahamson, director of the organization for the implementation of the "strategic defense initiative," acknowledged that years and billions of dollars will be required before it can be ascertained whether SDI is capable of creating a "shield." In a ratio of 20 to 1 members of the U. S. National Academy of Sciences, in one of the surveys, expressed doubt that in the next 25 years it will be possible to create a reliable shield against nuclear attacks. Critical remarks about SDI also resound in the U. S. Congress.

All this alarms the adherents of "Star Wars." But they do not wish to abandon their plans. To the contrary, they are undertaking every possible measure to force the efforts on the outlined programs, in a number of cases at the cost of, so to speak, their "truncation." The NEW YORK TIMES a few days ago brought to light a "top secret project" for accelerated development of SDI. According to information at the disposal of the newspaper, the leaders of the "Star Wars" program have reoriented the efforts being carried out within the SDI framework to the earliest possible deployment of a less

complex ABM system with space based elements. Newspaper reviewer F. Louis assesses all of this as a desire to carry out a policy of "fait accompli," and tie the hands of future U. S. administrations to the "strategic defense initiative."

The haste of the advocates of "Star Wars" is also explained by their desire to get out of the 1972 ABM Treaty before the real possibility for concluding a new agreement on strategic weapons with the Soviet Union appears. Plans are to carry out early deployment of certain space weapons systems in 1994-1995. It is anticipated that these systems will include non-nuclear self-guided space based interceptor missiles and from 400 to 1,000 ground based interceptor missiles, created according to an accelerated schedule.

Washington is also trying to draw its allies into the dangerous path of "stellar" adventures. And, in a number of cases she is doing so with some success. This week Japan became the fifth country to subscribe to the implementation of the American "strategic defense initiative." Britain, the FRG, Italy and Israel took this step before her. In this way, in particular, Washington strives to use SDI to create a "unified technological front" of the West against the socialist world, and, moreover, to consolidate the capitalist world.

Attention must also be paid to this fact. Attaching to SDI its European sister, so called "EuroSDI," the adherents of "Star Wars" intend to find a convenient channel to bypass the ABM Treaty. The European states are not participants in this treaty and, therefore, are not tied by the limitations contained within it. Apropos of this, it is no accident that the prospects for achieving a "double zero solution" cause open irritation among the militarists. In this case the very idea of "EuroSDI," which even now does not enjoy particular popularity, will become entirely senseless. So they invent all manner of "linkages," trying if not to defeat, then at least to delay adoption of a decision on intermediate range and operational-tactical weapons.

But, it is becoming more and more difficult to invent such "linkages" and "stipulations." The constructive, consistent policy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community is knocking the ground out from under the inveterate missile adherents and their spiritual brothers, the scheming "Star" adventurers. The new peace initiative set forth in M. S. Gorbachev's answer to the questions of the Indonesian newspaper (MERDEKA) made a tremendous impression on the peoples all over the planet. It stated directly the impermissibility of shifting the arms race into space, and the grave consequences for peace that undermining the ABM Treaty would entail.

Space must be peaceful. This is the fundamental position of the Soviet Union, which it unalterably defends. All healthy minded people on earth, who are truly concerned about the problems of preserving life on our planet, share

and support this position. Not "star" adventures, but peaceful exploration of space — that is what meets the most vital aspirations of mankind.

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USSR: Pave Paws in Thule Violates ABM Treaty
52001634a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jul 87 p 3

[Article by Col N. Morenko: "One More Dangerous Step"]

[Text] The U. S. administration has taken one more step in violation of the international commitments it has made. In the area of Thule, Greenland a large new phased array radar, intended for warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, has been placed in operation. This step is a gross violation of two provisions of the Soviet-American Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty at once — Article VI and Coordinated Statement F.

Let us recall that Article VI of the ABM Treaty permits the deployment of strategic ballistic missile attack warning radars only along the periphery of national territories, with outward orientation. And Coordinated Statement F establishes strictly determined locations for the placement of large phased array radars. The states participating in the treaty are permitted to build them if they are intended for warning; also only along the periphery of their national territory and nowhere else.

The U. S. tries to justify its gross violation of its international treaty obligations by stating that no deployment of a new radar in Thule has taken place, and that only modernization of old warning radars, associated with the BMEWS system, which have existed in this area since the mid-1960s, has occurred. And, they say, the ABM Treaty does not prohibit modernization of such radars.

In fact, in the early 1980s modernization of the BMEWS radar system took place, and then the Soviet Union did not display concern. After modernization to the position at Thule, the U. S. left the previously existing radars with reflective antennas, retained by mutual agreement between the USSR and U. S. during development of the ABM Treaty.

Now they want to pass off the deployment of the new radar in Thule as modernization. But C. Weinberger, U. S. Secretary of Defense, himself stated at a hearing in Congress: "To improve the functioning and effectiveness of the BMEWS system, we are replacing the obsolete radar in two locations with new phased array systems... In Fiscal Year 1986 we will complete the building of a new radar at Thule in Greenland." Thus, the Pentagon chief himself acknowledged that in Thule, under conditions of secrecy, construction of a new radar is taking place, and not "modernization" of those that existed there previously.

As a result of the efforts conducted in Thule in 1984-1987, instead of five previously existing radars with reflective antennas, dispersed some distance from one another, one phased array radar of fundamentally new design was deployed. These actions can in no way be categorized as modernization.

In fact the radar in the Thule area is a new station, intended, according to the statements of American specialists, to provide warning of strategic ballistic missile attack. It is deployed in Greenland, a country that is in no way United States territory. Col Knapp, commander of the American military base in Thule, in a conversation with a correspondent of the Danish newspaper LAND OG FOLK, was forced to acknowledge that the power potential of the new radar exceeds the permissible limits provided for by the ABM Treaty. This station processes and provides target designation about objects 100 times quicker than the old stations. Its detection range is 5,080 kilometers, and its zone of detection is 240 degrees. Thus, the clear deviation from the ABM Treaty is obvious.

Lt Col Miller, commander of the new radar complex, also spoke to the Danish newspaper correspondent about the great capabilities of the radar in Thule. In his words, the station in Thule provides highly accurate detection of missiles and space objects, and is capable of tracking a large number of warheads simultaneously and providing data for their destruction by ABM means. He also stated that this radar will be capable in the future of supporting the active ABM means being created in the SDI [Space Defense Initiative] program with target designations.

It is also known that the United States has begun construction of a similar large phased array radar in the area of Fylingdales Moor (England). It is going on a significant distance from the location of previously existing stations in this area. However, here also the U. S. is trying to hide behind the screen of "modernization" of the radar.

The placing of large phased array radars on foreign territories is being carried out by the U. S. in order, not withstanding the ABM Treaty (Article 1), to create the radar bases for the large scale ABM system with space based elements provided for by the SDI program. The prohibition on the deployment of warning radars beyond the boundaries of national territory was introduced precisely to increase confidence in the effectiveness of limitations on the creation and deployment of anti-missile defense. And here the PAVE PAWS type radar in Thule, as well as that being built in Fylingdales Moor, are capable according to their specifications of not only fulfilling the function of warning, but also of fulfilling missions of an ABM radar. Such a radar moved out beyond the boundaries of U. S. territory makes it possible to detect targets at long ranges and to provide target designations to other ABM means on U. S. territory. Thus, these stations, along with the PAVE PAWS radars located on U. S. territory at Robbins, Otis, Beale and

Goodfellow bases, as well as the ABM radar at the base in Grand Forks, may constitute the basis for deployment of ABM defense of the territory of the country.

The deployment in Greenland and Britain of large American phased array radars, which possess ABM capabilities, must be viewed as a potential violation of Article 9 of the treaty, which bans "deployment outside national territory of ABM systems or their components."

The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned the United States that its activity in creating PAVE PAWS type radars, including outside U. S. territories, is unlawful and contradicts the ABM Treaty. However, the U. S. has ignored these appeals every time. It is becoming obvious that the U. S. observes the international obligations it has taken on only until they interfere with its militaristic plans. It acted in this way at the end of 1986 with respect to the SALT-II Treaty, and it is preparing to act in this manner with respect to the ABM Treaty.

In a statement by the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] the Soviet Union insists that the U. S. immediately take steps to rectify the actual violation of the ABM Treaty that it has committed. Not violating, but strengthening the treaty is the necessary prerequisite for achieving agreements on radical reductions of nuclear weapons. This is well known to the U. S. administration, and the Soviet Union has a right to hope that it will not derail this most important document.

9069

Soviet Journal On European Defense Initiative
*181600120 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 8, Aug 87 (signed to press 17 Jul 87) pp 129-131*

[Article by A. Zhakov, A. Mitropolskiy: "'European Defense Initiative': Purposes, Means, Consequences"]

[Text] History teacher N.B. Zabusova (Moscow) asks us to describe what the "European Defense Initiative" represents.

On both sides of the Atlantic recently there has been extensive discussion of the so-called "European Defense Initiative" (EDI). It is a question of the creation in West Europe of an ABM system capable of destroying operational-tactical missiles and medium-range missiles (INF).

The EDI plan emerged at the start of the 1980's, at the time of the preparations for the deployment in West Europe of the American cruise missiles and Pershing 2's. It was anticipated that the creation of a "tactical ABM system" (TABM) could serve to lessen their vulnerability. Political, military and industrial circles of the United States began little-by-little to encourage their allies in the development of a continental ABM system. As earlier (on the question of NATO's "retroarmament"), the

initiator was the FRG. At the end of 1982 its Defense Ministry put forward the idea of the creation of a "new defense system". As if in response, a Pentagon study group under F. Hoffman engaged in the elaboration of a plan for realization of an ABM program for U.S. territory, pointed to the need for and desirability of the creation of an antimissile system in Europe.

Advancement in the United States of the SDI program lent new impetus to the idea of a TABM for Europe. Advantage was taken here of Europeans' fears in connection with a "window of vulnerability" opening as a result of realization of the SDI. The conclusion was that in order for West Europe not to become a "reduced-security zone" it was essential that it create its own antimissile system. However, from the very outset military figures of NATO countries had in mind merely defense "of the most important facilities in the European theater" (per the Hoffman Commission classification), and the Americans, what is more, were looking primarily to cover their offensive nuclear potential deployed in Europe. For the purpose of associating the allies of Bonn and Washington in realization of the plan the question of an EDI was discussed at the initiative of FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner in December 1985 at the NATO Eurogroup session.

Each country supporting this program sees the specific conditions and paths of its realization differently.

United States. For Washington the optimum version would be the creation of a TABM by the Europeans themselves and with their resources. The developed ABM system here should become the "property" of NATO. However, nor does the Pentagon preclude the possibility of a general "NATO" version of work on the system. By July 1986, according to B. Rogers, who at that time held the position of supreme commander of NATO joint armed forces Europe, the bloc's military command had already mapped out the basic principles of leadership of the research and development of a "potential defense system". A number of studies had already been conducted by this time. Rogers proposed the allocation for this purpose of some of the funds appropriated for the SDI program in the United States.

Canvassing the TABM for West Europe, Washington is offering to make available the original information obtained both as a result of special research and at the time of studies conducted within the SDI framework and to organize the joint research of West European and American scientists. Thus the intended system would be to a certain extent an "appendage" of the American program. All this would afford the United States an opportunity to keep it under its control.

In addition, such a system, in the American thinking, could be created and deployed far more quickly than broad-based ABM defenses with space-based components. And the first stage, furthermore, practicable, the United States, believes, in a very short time, could be the

modernization of the American Patriot air defense complexes already deployed in West Europe for the purpose of their use together with the latest radar stations and computers against INF and operational-tactical missiles.

FRG. West German military industry is very assertive in supporting European technology and realization of the TABM by itself. The biggest concerns would like to take control of realization of the EDI and "play the lead" in implementation of this program.

Government circles (particularly representatives of the CDU/CSU bloc) and the Bundeswehr are demonstrating their interest in cooperation with their "senior partner"—the United States—in realization of the TABM, agreeing that an essential component thereof should be the modified Patriot air defense system.

Simultaneously the Defense Ministry has already drawn up its own program of the further development of the TABM "thanks to expansion of the air defense system". The ministry budget for 1987 provides for appropriations for research into the creation of ABM systems. At the same time individual Bundeswehr representatives are even now speaking of the desirability of the transfer subsequently of individual components of the TABM system to space and the use in its technology of "nuclear potential".

France. Interest in the EDI accords with the concept adopted by Paris of the inevitability of the militarization of space. The appeal of President F. Mitterrand to West Europe to intensify the orientation toward a military presence in near-Earth space in order not to lag behind the "superpowers" back at the start of 1984 was heard precisely in this context. Paris has repeatedly expressed official approval of the idea of the development of a TABM system with "quasi-strategic potential"; the actual path of realization of the idea, however, is conceived of as being completely West European, without any participation on the part of the United States.

Considerable emphasis is being put on the tandem of the two West European states more interested in this military program—France and the FRG. In June 1985 the question of the creation of a TABM system was discussed by the Franco-German Security Commission with the participation of representatives of the defense and foreign ministries. At the meeting of F. Mitterrand and H. Kohl at the end of the same year it was decided to set up a joint commission on cooperation in the sphere of aircraft construction and the conquest of outer space, which, specifically, was entrusted with elaborating the project of a TABM for West Europe.

Franco-West German relations in this sphere are complicated primarily by the endeavor of each country to perform the leading role in implementation of the TABM plans. And France, furthermore, advocating a completely European version of the program, does not want the United States associated with it, fearing that,

given the support of Washington, the FRG would facilitate for itself access to modern technology and strengthen its positions in West Europe, possibly to the detriment of Paris. The close relationship which exists between the FRG and the United States puts limits on its military cooperation with France.

In the opinion of certain (primarily military) circles in France, Eureka, a program aimed at coordination of the West Europeans' scientific research, could contribute to realization of the EDI to a considerable extent.

The fact that a number of firms and concerns which are simultaneously involved in research pertaining to the SDI program—Siemens and MBB (the FRG), Thomson (France), General Electric (Britain) and others—are participating in Eureka could contribute to the use of civil research for military purposes. In addition, many West German firms participating in Eureka are at the same time interested in research work connected with a TABM.

Italy. The political leadership of the country and the military have repeatedly expressed approval of the program in principle, giving as the reason for this primarily the need to have a European "means of deterrence" independent of the United States. However, the Italians are clearly not suited by the charted prospect of a Franco-German condominium, in which connection they are making their participation conditional upon "sponsorship" of the EDI on the part of the Western European Union.

Italy is suited here by a version which would be based to a greater extent on the S&T potential of the United States than on the West Europeans' own efforts: the state's financial difficulties on the one hand and skepticism in respect of Eureka on the other are reflected here.

The ruling circles of the remaining West European countries are adopting a wait-and-see position. London has on several occasions commented favorably on this idea; on a number of occasions representatives of military circles of Spain and Portugal have made a positive assessment.

The disagreements and different interpretations which exist in connection with possible ways of realization of the EDI and the lack of some definite attitude toward it in certain NATO and Western European Union countries largely explain the fact that the idea has not as yet acquired a multilateral organizational structure.

Versions of the design of the TABM are, meanwhile, already appearing in interested circles of West European countries. A number of military experts is proposing the deployment of certain components thereof in space. The creation of a rapid-fire "railgun," which would be able to scatter metal bodies, guiding them toward missiles in flight, is planned. The use of a high-energy laser capable

of piercing and thus destroying missiles is being discussed. The deployment of ABM interceptors (of the modernized Patriot system, possibly) is envisaged. All these ground-based weapons it is contemplated guiding with an air- and space-based detection, tracking and guidance system.

Specific research in the said areas, in which considerable resources are being invested, is already being performed by a number of major West European concerns and firms. They include MBB, AEG-Telefunken, Siemens, Lorenz and Diehl (FRG), Thomson and Aerospatiale (France) and Philips (Netherlands).

The fact that components of a TABM system are already being developed will undoubtedly facilitate the adoption of a decision on its deployment, if things get this far—within the framework of NATO and the Western European Union or a multilateral military agreement. Understanding this, interested circles in the United States and West Europe are encouraging the military-industrial concerns in their studies.

The dangerous nature of the venture concerning an EDI is not in doubt. It is one further NATO attempt to

disrupt the existing "Eurostrategie" and global balance of forces and alter it in favor of the North Atlantic bloc. A system covering first-strike weapons is aimed not at consolidating security but ensuring impunity—and is directly analogous to the American SDI here. The "European Defense Initiative" and the "star wars" program are also linked in the fact that a gamble is being made in both instances on the creation of weapons systems based on supermodern technology. Thus there is the danger of the emergence of an additional new channel of the arms race. Furthermore, the technology of the "defensive system" could have a multitude of individual applications in the conventional arms sphere. Implementation of this plan would complicate the solution of questions of a military nature within the framework of the Helsinki process.

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8850

USSR: Further on Shevardnadze Visit, Arms Talks

Talks With Shultz Begin

LD301525 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT
30 Oct 87

[Text] Washington October 30 TASS—Talks opened here today between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, foreign minister of the USSR, and George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state. They center on key issues of Soviet-U.S. relations.

Before the meeting at the State Department the Soviet foreign minister described "as a good sign" the continuation of Soviet-U.S. talks in Washington. It means that work is kept going and this promises results, he said.

Foreign Ministry Meeting

LD301614 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT
30 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—Soviet-American consultations on questions of foreign policy planning were held at the USSR Foreign Ministry. The group of representatives of the U.S. Department of State was led by Director of the Policy Planning Staff Richard Solomon. The group of representatives of the USSR Foreign Ministry was headed by member of the Collegium, Chief of the Evaluation and Planning Directorate Lev Mendelevich.

Useful businesslike exchange of opinion on a wide range of questions, connected with long-range prospects for the development of the world situation, specifically Soviet-American relations, was held during the consultations. Much attention was paid to problems of international security in every area, on a global and regional scale.

Richard Solomon had conversations with USSR Deputy Foreign Ministers Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Vladimir Petrovskiy, and Igor Rogachev.

The American representatives also had meetings with Soviet scientists dealing with international problems.

Delivers Gorbachev Note

LD301908 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1900 GMT 30 Oct 87

[Text] Washington, 30 Oct (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, met U.S. President Ronald Reagan in the White House today.

Eduard Shevardnadze handed the U.S. President a personal message from Mikhail Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary. Before the meeting began, the President said that there is progress being made. Eduard Shevardnadze noted that prospects are good.

Summit Scheduled 7 Dec

PM311455 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Oct 1987
Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Joint Announcement"]

[Text] Washington, 30 Oct, TASS—As an evolution of the progress in Soviet-U.S. relations, including the results of the high-level exchanges of opinions and discussions between E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and G. Shultz, U.S. secretary of state in Washington 30 October this year, as well as the Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan have agreed to hold a meeting in the United States beginning on 7 December 1987.

The CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and the U.S. President attach exceptional importance to the substantive conduct of the new meeting, which will embrace the whole set of matters pertaining to relations between the two countries—arms reduction, human rights and humanitarian issues, the settlement of regional conflicts, and problems of bilateral relations—and which will secure considerable progress on the whole spectrum of these issues.

The sides agreed on a plan of action for further developing the Soviet-U.S. dialogue, including the following. They have reached an agreement to complete shortly the coordination of a treaty on the total elimination of U.S. and USSR medium- and shorter-range missiles.

During their meeting in the United States, the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and the U.S. President, in addition to examining the whole range of matters on Soviet-U.S. relations, will sign a treaty on the total elimination of U.S. and USSR medium- and shorter-range missiles. They will determine an agenda for future contacts between the leaders of the two countries and will examine in an all-round way the issue of drafting instructions for their delegations regarding a future treaty on a 50% reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms and an accord on observing the treaty on limiting antimissile defense systems and not violating it during an agreed on period.

The CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and the U.S. President envisage meeting subsequently in the Soviet Union. At that meeting they will also endeavor to achieve progress on the whole spectrum of Soviet-U.S. relations. To that end, the sides will work toward the early drafting of a treaty to implement the accord on a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms. That treaty could be signed during the U.S. President's visit to Moscow.

USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz will closely coordinate their actions to ensure that the forthcoming summit meeting in Washington is thoroughly and efficiently prepared.

Reagan Statement on Summit

LD302116 Moscow TASS in English 2058 GMT
30 Oct 87

[Text] Washington October 30 TASS—Upon completion of the meeting with USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze in the White House on Friday, U.S. President Ronald Reagan made a statement for the press.

He made an announcement on the understanding reached to hold a new Soviet-American summit meeting in the United States beginning on December 7 this year. At that time we expect, he said, to sign an agreement on the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles. As the President went on to say, the letter delivered by the Soviet foreign minister from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, sets forth his views on other arms reductions topics that should be discussed during the forthcoming meeting. "I am studying that letter carefully and it appears forthcoming and statesmanlike", Reagan said. The President said, "I am looking forward to welcoming Mr Gorbachev to Washington and to productive discussions with him".

Reagan Visit Announced

LD310030 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0005 GMT 31 Oct 87

[Text] Washington, 31 October (TASS)—After completing talks on Friday with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, Eduard Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, replied to questions from reporters who had gathered in the State Department.

Eduard Shevardnadze announced that the agenda and the content of the summit meeting beginning on 7 December between Mikhail Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, and President Ronald Reagan in Washington had been determined. "This is a most important question, the Soviet minister stressed. We have found, and this, too, is very important," he continued, "an appropriate formula for preserving the ABM Treaty. And, lastly, we have fixed a further schedule of future meetings, including an agreement with the President about his visit to the Soviet Union. We have agreed on the documents and the agreements with which this visit will end."

The USSR foreign minister noted that there are still divisions over the observance of the ABM Treaty. "In principle," he said, "we have reached an agreement on ABM. There are differences over [observance] periods." The Soviet minister noted that the U.S. side is insisting on a 7-year observance period of the ABM Treaty, while the Soviet side wants a 10-year period. "This is a subject that requires serious discussion," stressed Eduard Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze News Conference

PM012025 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 1987
Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Results of the Talks in Washington"]

[Text] Washington, 31 Oct—The working visit to Washington by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR foreign minister, has ended. On Friday he held talks with U.S. President R. Reagan and Secretary of State G. Shultz. At the meeting in the White House E.A. Shevardnadze handed to President R. Reagan a message from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. A Soviet-U.S. joint announcement has been published on the results of the talks concerning an accord that has been reached to hold a summit meeting in the United States between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan beginning 7 December.

Summing up the results of the talks at a news conference in the USSR Embassy, E.A. Shevardnadze stated:

We arrived here from Prague, where a very interesting and substantive session of the Warsaw Pact countries' Foreign Ministers Committee had taken place at which important issues were discussed. I have come with a mandate not just from the Soviet leadership and M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but also with a mandate from our friends and allies.

Certainly, Soviet-U.S. relations remain complex, difficult and contradictory, but something else must also be said: Much has been changing of late, and changing for the better, following talks and following the summit meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik.

We appraise today's talks and today's meetings as productive and as an outstanding event in international life. This is a logical continuation of the process that has its origins in Geneva and Reykjavik. I believe that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's definition was quite right, that an intellectual breakthrough was achieved in Reykjavik on some most important fronts of our times.

The accords which were reached today at the meeting with President Reagan, when I passed on a special message from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and that with the secretary of state, were preceded by very important, major political actions such as, for example, the secretary of state's meetings and talks with the Soviet leadership in April this year, and the September talks in Washington at which accord in principle was reached on eliminating two classes of nuclear weapons—medium- and shorter-range. Also there were the Moscow talks between the secretary of state and the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet foreign minister, which we also view as productive and useful. Today's accords have

not come from nowhere. They are a logical culmination of a whole process which, as I have already said, begins with Geneva and Reykjavik.

I have no doubt that all people of goodwill welcome the decision, the accord on a meeting in Washington between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President Reagan, and correspondingly on a reply visit by the President to the Soviet Union in the first half of next year. This event is definitely of tremendous significance for international affairs.

It is very important that at the present stage, at the talks in Washington both with President Reagan and with the secretary of state, we have basically set the agenda both for the Washington summit meeting and for subsequent contacts. This is of tremendous fundamental importance.

You already know—it is stated in our agreed joint announcement—that an agreement on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles is to be signed in Washington. It is here, in essence, that the foundations are being laid for a future agreement on a 50-percent reduction of offensive strategic arms while preserving the ABM Treaty for the agreed duration. Today we have agreed that we must begin literally this very day to develop a very great deal of preparatory work in order that the summit meeting should proceed at a high level and with maximum efficiency. An appropriate working mechanism for preparing these major actions has been determined. I do not rule out the need for contacts at various levels. I have in mind the level of experts, meetings between specialists and maybe even meetings between the foreign ministers. So we are faced with a most enormous, or to be frank, gigantic piece of work. It turns out that there is no doubt about the conclusion and signing of an agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles. This work can be completed over a short period of time. That is what we determined at the talks today. There are very good prospects of concluding an agreement with the present U.S. Administration on a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. It is this which is the key problem of our time.

There are also certain other—I would like to mention this—positive trends in Soviet-U.S. relations. In Moscow this spring the secretary of state and I signed an agreement on peaceful cooperation in space. This involves good programs—almost 16 major programs. In Washington in September we signed an agreement on organizing centers for reducing nuclear danger. The decision was made—and this has already been announced—to begin broad-format negotiations on nuclear explosions. All these agreements and accords are also an indicator of the positive trends in Soviet-U.S. relations, although I stress that there are still many difficult issues which will still require from us a great deal of energy and great efforts to overcome them.

I can say that my colleagues, my delegation, as we say, are satisfied with the results of the Washington talks, inasmuch as agreement on a summit meeting has been reached at them. [In Moscow *Pravda* 1 November First Edition on page 4 the preceding sentence ends with “the Washington talks.”. The First Edition item is otherwise identical to the Second Edition version.] They will indeed be of important significance for the construction of fundamentally new relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Without doubt they will have a positive influence on the general situation on our planet. I know that the question, who lost and who won, will come up. I want to forestall it. It is a crude question. Everybody has won, because nuclear arsenals will be eliminated—medium- and shorter-range missiles; and all the more so if we manage to attain an agreement on the elimination of large arsenals of strategic offensive arms. In that way all the peoples populating our planet will win.

Then E.A. Shevardnadze replied to journalists' questions.

Question: The statement says that the question of observance of the ABM Treaty will be examined; are the sides agreed with regard to the interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

Answer: The question of interpretation was not discussed at the current talks. We think that the ABM Treaty should be observed in the form in which it was signed and ratified. Between ourselves and the U.S. Administration there are serious differences over the period of nonwithdrawal from the treaty. Altogether, the treaty is timeless—you know that. But as we are talking about commitments not to withdraw from the treaty, the United States is mentioning a 7-year period, while we are staying with the Reykjavik positions. A 10-year period for nonwithdrawal from the treaty was agreed in principle in Reykjavik. This is a problem which requires further discussion and coordination.

Question: Judging by what happened today, you evidently must be satisfied that the United States has made a concession—linking strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty? A previously secret CIA report was published recently which says that the Soviet Union is conducting work in the antimissile defense field, and it is not even talking about Krasnoyarsk. As the CIA maintains, you are close to the possibility of deploying a national system for the antimissile defense of the country's territory. Do you admit that this is so?

Answer: First, I do not feel that the United States has made any concessions. The ABM Treaty is our joint treaty. Let me remind you of President Reagan's statement that we must not allow this treaty to be eroded. He said that about a year ago. What concessions are we talking about? As for the question of so-called violations, of the Krasnoyarsk radar station and so on, you must be

aware that on our own initiative a group of U.S. congressmen visited the site of this radar station. They inspected it. They photographed everything there, took notes of everything. I don't know what impression they gained, but if we'd built it in violation of the ABM Treaty, we'd have had no need to invite the representatives of another state. Another point—Comrade Gorbachev, at his Moscow talks with the secretary of state, put forward the proposal that the building of this station should be 'frozen' [zakonservirovat]—at the present stage that's for 12 months—if the same is done regarding the radar station that is being constructed in Scotland. As far as the work in progress in the Soviet Union is concerned, I don't think I will be revealing any great secret if I say that if the United States carries out its SDI program, the Soviet Union will certainly react in an appropriate manner. We will not necessarily reply in kind. Our reply may be asymmetrical or less costly. This has been said more than once by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary.

Question: Do you deny that you are creating a strategic defense?

Answer: You know that we are creating the defense which the ABM Treaty permits. We are creating such a defense. Neither more nor less.

Question: How is one to react to the fact that a week ago the Soviet side was apparently not ready but is now ready to hold a summit meeting?

You've been misinformed. I was present at the talks. A live witness stands before you. Comrade Gorbachev told the secretary of State—and I think Mr Shultz can confirm this—that he wanted to visit the United States, meet the President and discuss the problems which are of mutual interest. But in order to organize such a meeting we quite rightly and with good reason pointed out the need for a concept of the meeting, an agenda for the meeting. I think the fact that in this respect we have now made progress at the Washington talks and specified both the concept and the agenda of the meeting—that step forward and precisely that circumstance has resulted in the question being decided positively. The visit was agreed to in Geneva in 1985, and there are not surprises or unexpected elements present in today's decision.

Question: Was that decision not made earlier, before today's meeting? Is it not the case that the general secretary informed the President of it in his message?

Answer: In his message he set out, as I've already said, I repeat, his understanding of the concept of the meeting, and correspondingly a list of the matters that must be discussed at the summit meeting. The opinions of the U.S. Administration and of the Soviet leadership corresponded as regards the concept and as regards the agenda.

Question: You talked about your hopes for a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms. Today, President Reagan said that the United States is 100% full of resolve to implement the SDI program. In your opinion, are reductions in strategic offensive arms possible if the United States refuses to limit the strategic defense program? [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1123 GMT on 31 October 1987 broadcasts a similar version of this report. However, the TASS item includes the following three paragraphs in their entirety. The *Pravda* version omits the next two paragraphs, and picks up at the sentence "For us the fundamental question..."]

Answer: You know, we are talking about a 50 percent reduction and about obligations not to withdraw from the treaty during an agreed time. That is the main dialectic.

Question: There were two important facts at Reagan's press conference today. First, in his statement, Reagan did not mention SDI at all. Second, CBS correspondent Bill Plante asked him whether the administration is flexible regarding the stages of the development [razvetyvaniye] of SDI and whether that may help an agreement to be reached on a 50 percent reduction in strategic arms. President Reagan said "yes." Do you acknowledge that there is such flexibility? Do you attach significance to that fact?

Answer: You know, I would address that question to President Reagan and the secretary of state. I stress once again: [Here *Pravda* resumes] For us the fundamental question is a 50 percent reduction and the obligation about nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty during a fixed period. We are saying a 10-year period. The other side is naming a 7-year period. Of course, we think it is necessary at least as a minimum to secure observance of the ABM Treaty for 10 years. That is our main principle.

Question: I still don't understand if agreement exists between the USSR and the United States regarding interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The administration claims that tests in accordance with the "Star Wars" program are possible according to the ABM Treaty. Are there difficulties here or disagreements?

Answer: I assume that discussions will be continued on the interpretation of the treaty. We think—this is the Soviet position: the treaty must be observed and preserved in the form in which it was signed and ratified.

Question: What does that mean in concrete terms?

Answer: That means that the treaty must be observed and systems which are banned by the treaty must not be developed [sozdavat]. The Americans and everybody else understand that.

Question: Does that include "Star Wars?"

Answer: To be frank, I am not sure that the SDI program is a realistic program. I am not a specialist in that area, but I have contacts with my friends, colleagues, scientists. Very many major scientists and specialists are expressing serious doubts as regards the practicability of that program. [The TASS version carries this next sentence; the *Pravda* item omits it, and picks up with "But it is a..."] I spoke at the UN General Assembly session and even quoted Academician Sakharov—a very major specialist in that area. Sakharov considers the program to be unpromising. [Here *Pravda* resumes] But it is a U.S. program. It is not our program. For us, the most important thing is observance of the ABM Treaty. It is that which is the foundation of strategic stability under the conditions of a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, that is the chief guarantee of strategic stability. [The *Pravda* version omits the next eight paragraphs, picking up with "Question: When you were..."]

Question: Did you receive assurances from the U.S. side to the effect that a treaty on medium-range missiles and in particular a treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons will be presented in good time to the Senate and will be ratified during the Reagan administration? Or did they not give such assurances?

Answer: We repeatedly asked this question because we have bitter experience. For example, the SALT II Treaty was simply not ratified, and this is not the only occasion. But I believe that at present no one from the administration can give a complete guarantee that a treaty will be ratified. I stress: a complete guarantee. We have had contacts with senators, congressmen, and specialists. Unless I am mistaken, the array of forces now appears such that a treaty will be ratified. Although there may be changes. It is difficult to say.

Question: In the event of the ratification of these agreements, will it be possible to speak of the start of a new period of detente, of a new era in Soviet-U.S. relations?

Answer: I have already expressed a view on this score. Yes, if these treaties are ratified, then to a significant degree this will be a new stage, a most important stage, and not only in Soviet-U.S. relations. This is a very important trend reflecting, in a certain sense, a warming in the international atmosphere.

Question: President Reagan was today stressing the importance of verification measures [mery Kontrolya]. Do you see any problems in this sphere?

Answer: Very many problems. At present we are overcoming problems linked with the elimination of two classes of missiles—of medium- and shorter-range [words indistinct] we are at the concluding stage. However, questions linked to verification [kontrol] will be much greater and more complicated, when the question of a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons is really placed on the agenda. This is a more complex question. For this reason, we have today reached agreement in

principle with the secretary of state, at this stage to bring to the fore precisely the questions of verification of the organization of verification, and the examination of all this subject matter.

Question: President Reagan has invited Gorbachev to undertake a wide trip through the United States. Today it was given to understand that this will not take place. How long does Gorbachev plan to stay in the United States? Does he intend to travel anywhere apart from Washington, and what are the reasons for his coming on a short visit?

Answer: The reasons are elementary. First, what lies ahead is not a short visit. Two or three days for businesslike talks is quite a lot. Comrade Gorbachev has a great desire to travel through the United States, to visit many sites and states and to meet the American people. But he has a very heavy and complex schedule. In practical terms it can't be done. That is the only reason.

[Here the *Pravda* version resumes] Question: When you were here in September you spoke of the possibility of a compromise on SDI in two areas. The first was the adoption of restrictions on testing and development [sozdaniye] of systems, and the second was an accord on adherence to the ABM Treaty. Have you given up attempts to restrict testing and work in the framework of SDI?

Answer: Maybe there is something that I did not put too well, or maybe there is something you did not understand. I never spoke of a compromise regarding SDI. The matter concerned something else. It concerned us and the Americans coming to agreement and defining a list of the devices that would be banned from being put into space. Accordingly defining, and we have already passed these proposals to the Americans, defining the parameters and characteristics of those devices. Anything below those characteristics and parameters would not be banned. That is what I was talking about. That is what I reaffirmed at the talks today. [The *Pravda* version omits the following four paragraphs, picking up at "Question: Do you..."].

Question: Would you like Gorbachev to speak in Congress, and does he intend to visit the United Nations in New York?

Answer: I will say straightaway that it will not be possible to visit New York this time. As far as meeting Congress is concerned, the program is currently being drafted. I do not rule out the possibility of such a meeting. So far we do not have the program.

Question: The statement contains some formulations from which one can draw the conclusion that when the 50 percent agreement and observance of the ABM Treaty are to be discussed when Reagan travels to the USSR, he

will be signing an agreement on strategic offensive weapons, but the ABM Treaty is not mentioned. Is it intended that the Soviet Union is prepared to sign an agreement just on strategic offensive weapons without any accord on ABM?

Answer: I believe the ABM Treaty is mentioned in one place. It is spoken of very precisely and clearly. That provision will be in effect when the treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons is signed.

[Here *Pravda* resumes] Question: Do you take it as a promise that agreements on the 50 percent cut and observance of the ABM Treaty are a condition for Reagan's visit to the Soviet Union, or could a visit take place even without this?

Answer: We must prepare the ground for a substantive visit. As we understand it, and the U.S. Administration agrees with this, the chief result of this visit could be the signing of an agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. I have already said that such a prospect exists, and use must be made of this. I do not think I will be giving away any particular secret if I say that the President today spoke about there being a unique chance to conclude such an agreement. I agree with him, it is indeed a unique chance.

Question: You said that today you have confirmed the Soviet proposal on the list of devices. Has the United States given you to understand that it is ready to conduct negotiations on this subject? [The *Pravda* version omits the following six paragraphs and then two more sentences, picking up at "Answer: To be frank and honest..."]

Answer: This question is being discussed at the Geneva negotiations. These are fairly difficult categories, namely the listing of these parameters and specifications. They are on something like the level of higher mathematics. All these questions must therefore be discussed at expert level at the Geneva talks.

Question: But is the United States conducting negotiations on that?

Answer: In principle, this question is on the agenda and is being discussed.

Question: Will President Reagan's visit to Moscow for the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons and on the 50 percent reduction also be a visit during which an accord will be signed on continued observance of the ABM Treaty?

Answer: I believe that I have already answered this question.

Question: A question in the spirit of glasnost. You are a member of the Politburo. Can you explain how you understand the reports from Moscow regarding a split, differences? Is that something that you have always had and it is only coming to the surface now? Or is something happening in your country?

Answer: No split had occurred before I left. I cannot say what happened after that. To come to the point, [Here the *Pravda* version resumes] to be frank and honest about it, there has probably never been such cohesion and such unity in the Soviet leadership, which are based on a Leninist style and founded on the principles of comradeship, and we are proud of that. We believe that this type of atmosphere in the Soviet leadership, and indeed throughout the entire party, an atmosphere of creativity, of joint responsibility, of collectiveness, of a respectful attitude toward one another is a very great gain. Do differences of opinion occur in our party with regard to individual problems, even the fundamental problems of modern times, including questions of restructuring, perfecting society, renewal of socialism, perfecting socialism, and so forth? Naturally there are different opinions, and differing views are expressed. Among them, very many of these views are printed in our press, but that is a completely natural phenomenon. It reflects the process of democratization in Soviet society. That is how I can answer your question. [The *Pravda* version includes the following two paragraphs, omitted by the TASS report]

E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR foreign minister, left Washington for home the same day.

At the airfield in Moscow E.A. Shevardnadze was greeted by V.M. Chebrikov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR KGB, and other officials.

'Spokesman' Interviewed

LD311308 Paris Domestic Service in French 1200 GMT
31 Oct 87

[Excerpts] The Reagan-Gorbachev tete-a-tete meeting will take place on 7 December in Washington. It will be the third meeting between the two leaders. At the center of their talks will be the signing of an agreement on the dismantling of medium-range missiles. [passage omitted]

Moscow is very satisfied with the announcement of this new dialogue, during which many questions will be tackled. Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman (Aleksis Glukhov) expresses his feelings to our permanent correspondent in Moscow, Ulysee Gosset:

[Begin recording] [Glukhov, speaking in French] My first feeling is one of satisfaction because it is not only the wish of the leaders but also that of the Soviet people.

[Gosset] Do you think that on 7 December all the existing problems will be solved?

[Glukhov] All of them? I do not think so; it is first of all a question of being able to sign an agreement on medium-range missiles, and this is very important. It is also a question of making progress in the field of strategic missiles and also of taking steps toward an agreement on the issue of space defense.

[Gosset] If the summit is taking place so soon, is it not also because Euromissiles as well as strategic arms will be discussed?

[Glukhov] Certainly, certainly. As I have already stated, the issue of strategic missiles is perhaps even more important than that of medium-range missiles. It is also a question of making progress in Washington during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit on this issue. [end recording]

Shultz Cited on Results

LD311023 Moscow TASS in English 1002 GMT
31 Oct 87

[Text] Washington October 31 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, speaking at a press conference on the results of his negotiations with Foreign minister of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze, has said: "In the arms control area, obviously we are pushing hard on INF. We've had some further discussion of particular issues here".

"On strategic arms", George Shultz said, "if we work at it hard, we can keep moving the ball forward in the strategic arms area, and we want to see the summit meeting between the President and the general secretary be as useful as possible in helping negotiations toward completion of a strategic arms treaty to be signed in Moscow by the President sometime in the first half of next year".

The secretary of state underlined that during the visit of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to Washington the United States would "maximize the usefulness of the limited time available" to see to it that the visit be efficient.

Shultz Remarks Cited

LD311742 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1030 GMT 31 Oct 87

[Text] Speaking at a news conference on the results of his talks with Shevardnadze, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz said that the proposals made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on strategic weapons were discussed.

Shultz added: If we make persistent efforts, we will be able to make some headway in strategic weapons. We want the summit between the President and the general secretary to be as useful as possible so as to promote

success in the talks on a strategic arms treaty that can be signed by the President in Moscow sometime in the first half of next year. Before that summit takes place, we are trying to do as much as possible to define the problems and narrow the differences so that when the general secretary and the President meet, they can achieve even greater mutual understanding which our delegations will then be able to take advantage of at their negotiations. In Reykjavik, and then to a certain extent later on, the secretary of state continued, some absolutely vital components of the treaty on strategic arms reductions were agreed to. After Reykjavik, we added a few components. Now we will have to set about working on the problems of verification [proverka].

The secretary of state stressed that the United States will try during the visit of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary to Washington to use the limited time available to the maximum advantage so that the visit is a fruitful one.

Reagan, Shultz Cited

PM311805 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 87
First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Washington's Opinion"]

[Text] Washington, 31 Oct—After the meeting in the White House with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze, U.S. President R. Reagan declared: "I am very pleased with the results of my discussions today. I am counting on, and I am impatiently awaiting, the opportunity to welcome Mr Gorbachev to Washington and also for productive talks with him." During his stay in the United States, R. Reagan observed, we are counting on signing an agreement on the elimination of a whole class of U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons. As the President went on to say, he "is carefully studying" the message from the CPSU Central Committee general secretary which "gives the impression of a frank [otkrovennyy] and constructive message full of statesmanlike wisdom."

"We also discussed recent events at other talks too," the U.S. President continued, "and I stress the importance which I attach to reaching an agreement on a 50% reduction of strategic offensive arms. We have agreed to try to conduct work on drafting such an agreement which I hope to sign during a visit to Moscow next year."

To a question about the possibility of a change in the U.S. stance on SDI, Reagan replied that we "can in no way abandon SDI." In answer to a question about the possibility of "flexibility regarding the time schedule for SDI deployment" he said that "this will be one of the questions submitted for discussion."

U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz said at a press conference on the results of his negotiations with E.A. Shevardnadze that, in the sphere of strategic arms, M.S. Gorbachev's proposals in this area had been discussed at the

talks. G. Shultz went on to say that "if we make dogged efforts, we will be able to move forward in the field of strategic arms and we want the summit meeting between the President and the general secretary to be as useful as possible, promoting the success of the talks on the completion of the elaboration of a treaty on strategic arms which would be signed by the President in Moscow some time in the first half of next year. We are trying above all to do as much as possible prior to that summit meeting's taking place, to define the problems and narrow the disagreements so that when the general secretary and the President meet, they will be able to achieve additional mutual understanding which our delegations will then be able to utilize at their talks." [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 November 1987 Second Edition on page four carries this same report, but deletes these next three sentences, picking up with "The secretary of state..."] Certain absolutely essential components of a treaty on the reduction of strategic arms, the secretary of state continued, were agreed in essence at Reykjavik and then to some degree later. After Reykjavik we added certain components. Now we must get down to work on the problem of monitoring [proverka].

The secretary of state stressed that the United States will try during the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's visit to Washington "to make maximum use of the limited time available" in order that the visit may be fruitful.

Kulik Commentary

*LD311629 Moscow TASS in English 1409 GMT
31 Oct 87*

[Text] Moscow October 31 TASS—By TASS Political News Analyst Sergey Kulik:

Welcoming the agreement to hold a Soviet-American summit meeting, many political analysts come to the conclusion that this was a result of persistent and specific efforts by peace-loving forces and materialization of principles of new political thinking that is being established in international affairs.

The prospect of concluding a "double missile zero" accord between Moscow and Washington, now quite real, is exclusively useful in itself. It would be invaluable should the treaty that Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan are going to sign become a first step towards the radical renunciation of nuclear and space arms.

This idea permeates the communique of the recent meeting in Prague of the Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers' Committee. Underlying this important document is recognition of interrelationship and interdependence of our complicated and diverse world.

Nurturing contradictions, dogmatism and cultivation of differences are simply dangerous in the nuclear age. It is only through concerted effort that it is possible to look

for and find truly humane and universal solutions to world problems. For that, there is no need for all to be similar. But the search should be not against one another, but with one another.

It is crucially important today that the world undertake no actions that might complicate the conclusion of the accords to be sealed during the meeting in the U.S. beginning on December 7.

That is why the participants in the Prague meeting were worried by remarks by some Western representatives who called for "compensation" for the planned elimination of American missiles in Europe by deploying new nuclear and non-nuclear arms and divising new military structures.

The allied socialist countries represented at the meeting in the Czechoslovak capital proceed from the firm conviction that lasting peace and reliable security of all and everyone could be ensured only through political means.

That is why the Warsaw Treaty member countries attach principled importance to achieving maximum effectiveness of the entire existing system of disarmament talks.

Issues of curbing the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament should be in the centre of talks on security and disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral.

It is necessary to step up the efforts by all nations to building a nuclear-free and non-violent world. The conference on disarmament in Geneva is to play a special role in these efforts.

The Prague meeting again put on the list of priorities the task of significantly reducing the armed forces and armaments in Europe. The committee issued a call for building a "common European home"—the indivisible Europe of peace and cooperation in which an atmosphere of goodneighbourhood and trust, co-existence and mutual understanding would be established.

Our similarity is above our differences—such is the suggested principle on the basis of which the search for the all-European future is to be conducted.

The international cropland to yield an abundant harvest needs deep ploughing. Surface ploughing, as the entire post-war period shows, can yield but temporary success and secure but limited progress.

Fundamental changes are required in the very structure of international relations. Their far-going, radical restructuring is required in the spirit of truly innovative thinking, in the spirit of universal human interests.

Zorin Commentary

LD010207 Moscow World Service in English
2300 GMT 31 Oct 87

["Moscow Viewpoint," by Valentin Zorin]

[Excerpts] A third Soviet-American summit is to start in the United States on 7 December. This was agreed upon during the brief visit to Washington by the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. In the course of the visit, he passed on to President Reagan a message from the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.

Shortly before that, both houses of Congress adopted legislation delaying funds for construction work on the deployment of American cruise missiles in Western Europe. When they passed this legislation the Senators and Congressmen followed this logic: Why earmark \$87 million the administration requires to site the missiles if the Soviet-American treaty to eliminate these weapons on a mutual basis and by most reliable verification is to be signed soon? So the treaty begins to work even though it has not been concluded yet. [passage omitted on economic benefits from cuts in nuclear arsenals]

This shows what remarkable benefits could be secured by a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms and by preventing an arms race in space, which is being discussed at Soviet-American negotiations. That would benefit the Americans and the Soviet people, too. Of course the talks aim mainly at eliminating the nuclear threat. The stockpiles would be sufficient to destroy all living [things] on earth many times over. Common sense indicates that the arsenals are absolutely unnecessary and dangerous, for even the use of only a small part of them would mean humanity's self destruction.

But the economic aspect of disarmament is no less important. If agreements similar to the one on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range weapons continue to be signed, the Soviet and American citizens and people elsewhere will become much better off.

U.S. Reaction Reported

PM021121 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 87
Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "Initial Response"]

[Text] Washington, 31 Oct—The word "history" in all its variations was used on the banks of the Potomac virtually throughout the day of 30 October. The word appeared in the headlines of news bulletins in America immediately after it was announced in the White House Rose Garden and then at press conferences in the presidential residence, the Department of State, and the USSR Embassy that it has been agreed to hold a meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and President R. Reagan in the United States.

"History is being made before our eyes"; "The two great powers are ready to sign a historic treaty"; "Washington will be the venue for a historic event"—such was the immediate response by U.S. radio and television companies to the results of the talks held here by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze.

The two sides took a very important step which really makes it possible to speak of creating the material base for the new political thinking. Only a first step, of course, which urgently needs further confirmation and development. But nevertheless a step which can only be welcomed by people of good will.

We would like the summit meeting between the general secretary and the President to be as useful as possible and to assist the talks aimed at completing the preparation of a treaty on strategic arms so that it could be signed by the President in Moscow in the first half of next year, Secretary of State Shultz declared at his press conference.

The administration's public pledges sound encouraging, making it possible to hope for a change for the better in relations between the USSR and the United States, which remain complex, difficult, and contradictory. Despite the clear favorable shifts, the Reagan administration continues to dodge crucial questions of our time, but the realities of our time are also influencing Washington. In this context, it is worth noting the response by WSA-TV, which pointed out: "In his statements the President suggested flexibility on various questions, even on the SDI program."

No U.S. political observer has any doubts that the "Star Wars" program is the main stumbling block along the path to unprecedented agreements in the sphere of arms control. This is because, as the Soviet side has pointed out, rigorous observance of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed and ratified can provide the sole foundation of strategic stability in the conditions of the 50% reduction of both sides' strategic arms now under discussion.

No one is ignoring the existence of serious divergences between the USSR and U.S. stances or the truly gigantic volume of work that still remains to be done in order to vindicate the hopes of people who are tired of the arms race madness and the permanent threat of a nuclear inferno. Initial reactions on Capitol Hill make it possible to speak of a hope that the legislators will realize their historic duty. R. Dole, leader of the Republicans in the Senate, congratulated the leaders of the two countries on the accord to hold the meeting and to sign a treaty on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles. He described the accord that is in preparation as "a step in the right direction." An identical stance was taken by S. Nunn, chairman of the influential Senate Armed Services Committee. On the whole, AP emphasizes, "reaction on Capitol Hill is positive." The majority of legislators lay special emphasis on questions of verifying the

observance of the provisions of the medium- and short-range missiles treaty. This is the standard anti-Soviet emphasis, since everyone has known for a long time that it is the U.S. side that refuses to accept the USSR proposals on full and exhaustive monitoring measures.

Be that as it may, E.A. Shevardnadze's talks in Washington ended on a positive note, causing satisfaction to both sides and the local public. Clearly everyone would like to hope that, being the mentor of life, history will yet lead the USSR and the United States onto the straight path in matters of disarmament and peace.

USSR: Gerasimov Comments on Summit Prospect, Issues

PM031519 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 28 Oct 87 p 12

[Marit Ingves report: "Gerasimov: Three Letter D's Are Central: Diplomats, Devils, Details"]

[Text] "The work on agreement for a cut in medium-range missiles is now concentrating on three D's — the diplomats and the little devils that have to be driven out of the details," Soviet Foreign Ministry press spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said yesterday, good-humoredly describing the current state of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States at a seminar in Helsinki arranged by the Journalists for Peace society.

It was a very optimistic Gerasimov who took part in the seminar, whose theme was medium-range missiles and various issues dealing with them.

"The Moscow meeting should not be seen as a failure. It was simply a step in the negotiating process. An agreement on medium-range missiles could be ready within 3 to 4 weeks," he said.

That will again raise the question of a possible summit between President Ronald Reagan and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the press spokesman said.

However, Gerasimov became a little irritated at having to return repeatedly to the summit.

"The important thing is not that Reagan and Gorbachev stand somewhere and embrace — the most important thing is that we achieve an agreement," he said.

Nor did he rule out the possibility that an agreement could be signed without the heads of state being present. In actual fact, in addition to the agreement itself, only a table and a pen are needed.

"It could even happen here," he said.

On the subject of a timetable for a summit Gerasimov referred to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' hopes that it will still be held this year, given the forthcoming

U.S. presidential election. However, the question of a date was not on the agenda in Moscow. According to Gerasimov, it was raised by the press.

Even though, according to Gerasimov, there is no point in arranging a summit for its own sake, it does have some advantages, he hinted.

"First Reykjavik was seen as a failure, but now the U.S. secretary of state is saying that it was the start of the process."

The Soviet Foreign Ministry press spokesman also rejected speculation that a Politburo meeting during Shultz' visit to Moscow blocked the summit.

In reply to a direct question about what happened at this meeting he said that the Politburo mainly discussed the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. According to Gerasimov, the Soviet position did not change during the meeting.

He also firmly rejected the suggestion that the Soviet Union had again linked the questions of medium-range missiles and the SDI space defense program. The Soviet Union has also compromised over strategic offensive weapons, and the 50% reduction in these already proposed has been adjusted so that the Soviet proposal is very close to the figures the United States previously put forward. These were given to the Americans during the meeting in Moscow. The United States is now considering its own response.

Gerasimov also stressed that the Soviet Union now wants guarantees that the disarmament process will not simply stop at an agreement on medium-range missiles. The country does not want any new agreements, but wants the old ones to be observed. He made special mention of the so-called ABM Treaty from 1972, which contains rules for the superpowers' missile defenses using antiballistic missiles.

USSR: Kondrashov on Summit, Arms Talks Prospects

PM291945 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Stanislav Kondrashov "Political Observer's Opinion": "New Hopes"]

[Text] Stylists do not recommend misusing one and the same word, but style is just style—priority must be given to the truth: In the nuclear era relations between two nuclear powers are determined by the extent to which the question of their nuclear arms is settled. It is extremely dangerous when the temperature of these relations suddenly soars like that of a nuclear reactor out of control. Exactly 25 years ago the world experienced two or three exceptionally risky days during the Caribbean nuclear

missile crisis. However, the real threat of a nuclear catastrophe made the two capitals feverishly seek and rapidly find an escape formula for a settlement.

A quarter of a (nuclear!) century is a long time, particularly for the young generation. As for the older generation, the October lessons were well learned, and despite all the crisis situations since then the world has not once come as close to the edge of the fatal abyss. This lesson, alas, still leaves others to be learned. Although the two powers started nuclear arms limitation talks soon after, they continued to improve and build up their nuclear weapons. Now people talk about a million Hiroshimas, or the equivalent of 3-4 tonnes of TNT for each member of the earth's 5-billion-strong population. It is said that the destructive force of the accumulated weapons would be enough for 6,000 World War II's. So, if you want peace, prepare for a war alongside of which all previous wars will seem like child's play. Following this pre-nuclear wisdom, we have prepared brilliantly for World War III. We still have to abolish this old wisdom and avoid a new war. Here it should be repeated that relations between two nuclear powers are determined by the extent to which the question of their nuclear arms is settled.

Exactly 25 years after the Caribbean crisis began U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz arrived for 2 days of talks in Moscow with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and his Soviet colleague, E.A. Shevardnadze. During this period there had been six secretaries of state and five Presidents before G. Shultz and four Soviet leaders before M.S. Gorbachev, but the subject of the talks was missiles again. Not Soviet missiles in Cuba, whose withdrawal was sought then by President John Kennedy, even though he had missiles of his own near Soviet borders—in Turkey and West Germany. The subject was Soviet and U.S. medium-range (1,000-5,000 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles sited in Europe and Asia.

In the last 25 years these missiles have also multiplied and they are now much more powerful and accurate. Of course, if all nuclear arsenals are lumped together this is just a trifle—2-3% of the total number of nuclear megadeaths. But even this trifle is quite enough to reduce the great old (and new) stones of Europe—both East and West—to rubble, enough to leave standing not a single stone of this centuries-old civilization. Fortunately, after the talks—which have lasted 7 years with long and short interruptions—both sides are approaching a successful finish and have started talking about eliminating the aforesaid missile classes and about two “global zeroes.” Of course, the threat to Europe will not be zero, but it will decrease handsomely.

The final details of the treaty were settled [utryasat] in Moscow last week. Or rather, the penultimate details. It is generally thought that it will still take several weeks for the negotiators to achieve the complete framework

[azhur]. It was still not very clear last week where and by whom this almost-ready Soviet-U.S. medium-range and operational-tactical missile treaty would be signed.

George Shultz left the Soviet capital 23 October in something of two minds. He was half satisfied, since a treaty was within reach and no insuperable obstacles were expected. He was half disappointed because M.S. Gorbachev, at his meeting with the secretary of state, did not set a date for his visit to Washington, which the Americans had been expecting. The possibility of a third Soviet-U.S. summit in 2 years seemed to be up in the air. The secretary of state was not bringing the President the nicest news. Overseas this produced a big sigh of disappointment, particularly at first, because last week was a very difficult one for Ronald Reagan: There was the “Black Monday” of 19 October, when share values on the New York Stock Exchange were slashed by one-fourth, destroying the myth of “Reaganomics”; and there was the “Black Friday” of 23 October, when the Senate rejected the candidacy of the extreme conservative Robert Bork, whom Reagan had nominated to the Supreme Court, thereby demonstrating that the President is losing political power in his own country and his own capital.

For all their pragmatism, the Americans are subject to emotions in politics. Does this perhaps explain why certain Washington officials, analyzing the news from Moscow, set about looking for the truth where it is not to be found? Thus, without further ado, Marlin Fitzwater, the White House press secretary, has expressed the conjecture that Gorbachev has cooled to the “idea of peace.” Or at least, others claim, Gorbachev has cooled to the Reagan administration. They are saying that, in stepping cautiously, Moscow has begun to look beyond the horizons of the present administration after deciding that it is necessary to wait and then do business with a new President rather than with a “lame duck.” On his return to Washington George Shultz tried to allay the passions by stressing the progress achieved, by emphasizing the positive aspect of his talks. Here in Moscow, too, I heard from one prominent U.S. official a high appraisal of the good progress made toward a definitive accord on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. Finally, the President himself, noting the successful work of the diplomats, declared: “We believe that an agreement will be signed.”

Nonetheless, the Washington stories about the “cooling off of interest” need to be analyzed, in my view. It goes without saying that Moscow was never hotly in favor of the Reagan administration, especially since this administration gave it absolutely no cause for such feelings. However, no matter how great the ideological incompatibility, the immutable political realities of the nuclear age have dictated, are dictating, and will continue to dictate to Moscow to do business with whatever administration is in power in Washington, and vice versa. After all, it is no secret that the incumbent President, despite his views about the Soviet Union, has also passed

through the school of these realities and has learned a few things. As a known quantity he is preferable to an unknown quantity which, moreover, does not yet exist. This is all the more true since Reagan's successor, as is customary in Washington, will most probably take a lot of valuable time to survey the world from the presidential seat and to learn to appreciate the selfsame realities.

Moscow is ready to seek a major breakthrough in the reduction of nuclear arsenals specifically with the present administration. This official position was reaffirmed before the world's press immediately after Shultz's visit. E.A. Shevardnadze's visit to Washington, which has only just been announced and which is to take place within the next few days, is a major sign of the acceleration and intensification of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue. World attention has now switched from the visit of the U.S. secretary of state to Moscow to the visit of the Soviet foreign minister to the U.S. capital. As has become known, he will deliver a personal message from the Soviet leader to the U.S. President. The question of the main item on the joint agenda—deep cuts in the two nuclear powers' strategic offensive arms—has arisen with dramatic new urgency. Of course, the possibility of a new meeting between the two leaders.

It ought to be mentioned that, when receiving G. Shultz, M.S. Gorbachev said: "I am ready to go to the United States." But...a new summit must be essentially practical in nature rather than solemnly ceremonial. Once the treaty on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles is signed, it will mark a page completed. What about the next pages?

Although logic does not reign supreme in international politics, it is reasonable to proceed from the premise that the payload should increase with each successive summit. Geneva was primarily a familiarization meeting. Reykjavik amazed people with its unusually bold proposals for the limitation of nuclear arms and resulted a year later in two "global zeros." A third meeting will be truly justified if it is crowned with an even more important breakthrough in the solution of the key task of a 50% cut in strategic offensive arms (to which both sides have agreed in principle, and the possibility of an accord on which has been brought nearer as a result of the sublevels proposed by the Soviet side for individual types of warheads.) Finally, according to the Soviet timetable, a fourth meeting in Moscow in the summer of next year could mean not merely a breakthrough but a signed treaty on a 50% cut in strategic offensive arms, and, incidentally, a worthy climax to Reagan's presidency in the sphere of Soviet-U.S. relations.

To return to the comparison which was made at the beginning of these remarks—the treaty on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles will eliminate no more than 200 out of the destructive potential of 6,000 World War II's stockpiled in the event of a third world war. A treaty on strategic offensive arms would halve the nuclear arsenals.

Moscow refuses to meet Washington halfway only where Washington refuses to move toward peace—on the issue of the nonplacement of weapons in space. It is impossible to achieve the required result by curbing the arms race in one sphere and developing it in another sphere where you hope to gain superiority over your negotiation partner. It is impossible in this way to achieve a military and political stabilization of the relations between the two countries and—this is also important—to derive economic advantage from a safer and less armed world. Disarmament means switching means from military to civilian building. For Moscow this is a matter both of principle and of the practice which takes account of the needs of our restructuring, of the needs of the "Third World," and of the interests of the peoples of the West which do not coincide with the interests of the "military-industrial complex."

Trying to explain what is happening in gambling terms, people across the Atlantic sometimes write that Moscow is raising the stakes. But the stakes are high indeed. They concern the future. The hopes pinned everywhere to the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations are also high. They must not be betrayed.

Beglov Discusses Chances

AU291230 Sofia ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME in Bulgarian
27 Oct 87 p 4

[Article by Spartak Beglov, NOVOSTI political observer: "Time For a Clear Answer"]

[Text] Moscow, 26 October. (*Zemedelsko Zname* correspondence).

The issue of reducing USSR and U.S. strategic offensive weapons by 50% was the dominant one during the talks of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz with the Soviet leaders.

On the basis of the delay in setting the date for the next summit meeting we must note that prior to the arrival of George Shultz, the U.S. side had not done the necessary preliminary work in order to ensure position on this matter that would be acceptable in Moscow. Such positions could have been constructively discussed by the leaders of the USSR and United States in Washington. Despite all this, Mikhail Gorbachev, looking forward, is making an effort to ensure that the visit by Ronald Reagan to Moscow, scheduled for next year, will produce an agreement on strategic offensive weapons. Such a document would be the most essentially possible and exceptionally necessary result in the area of disarmament today.

Therefore I shall not join those who hasten to conclude that a summit meeting in Washington until the end of the year is, you see, totally out of question. The Soviet leader again confirmed to the U.S. secretary of state that he is ready to come to Washington this year. He made new proposals affecting the limits of the reduction of the

basic components of the triad of strategic offensive weapons. Mikhail Gorbachev afforded the United States the opportunity to think and decide during the one and a half months left until the end of the year whether it is ready to adopt reciprocal steps, first of all on the issue that evoked the greatest concern in Moscow, namely, the ABM Treaty.

In order to understand the situation created in the USSR-U.S. dialogue, one must bear in mind the dynamics of the USSR-U.S. negotiations as seen by Moscow. Already in Reykjavik, where the two sides pointed out that the elimination of medium-range missiles was self-evident, the leaders of the USSR and the United States were unanimous that reducing strategic nuclear weapons by 50% would be a decisive measure which not only reduces the danger of a nuclear war, but also guarantees the irreversible development of the disarmament process.

Therefore the various stages during the year—such as George Shultz's talks in Moscow and Eduard Shevardnadze's talks in Washington—insistently posed the issue of reducing strategic offensive weapons as a central problem. After Eduard Shevardnadze's talks in Washington, the United States clearly indicated that by virtue of the evident progress in preparing the text of the agreement on medium and shorter-range missiles the two sides will shift the main stress in preparing the Washington summit meeting to coordinating mutually acceptable crucial premises of the future treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

It was decided that the Washington summit will be needed not so much for signing the agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles as for the two leaders to approve such crucial premises. The following

interesting detail is indicative: At the U.S. Congress they have started saying aloud that the ratification of a future agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles would depend on the progress in working out the treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

Prior to his arrival in Moscow George Shultz said that "he was already tired by the issue of medium- and shorter-range missiles." However, the main obstacle at the talks in Moscow, as we can see now, was the fact that the White House decided that it is not necessary to study Moscow's compromise proposal on setting certain limits to SDI tests. More specifically, we mean the proposal to coordinate the number of systems which cannot be tested in space.

This "detail" (which indeed is the boundary between the militarization and nonmilitarization of space) turned into an issue of crucial principled importance. Will the ABM Treaty survive or perish? The White House's claim that it has the right to create a new anti-missile defense because of the lack of limitations on the strategic offensive weapons, is totally unjustified. Moscow is justified in saying: Was it not the United States that refused to ratify the SALT-II Treaty, which envisaged the the first reductions of strategic offensive weapons would be made by the USSR?

Thus on the one hand the solution of the main problem is within the bounds of the possible. On the other hand, the moment of truth has arrived. The time has come for a clear answer to the question of whether the United States is ready to strictly observe the ABM Treaty, or the worse suspicions that Washington is interested in undermining this treaty above anything else will be confirmed. Now the ball is in Washington's court, despite the fact that time is evidently short.

USSR: Zagladin on INF Talks, Third Zero Option

PM031402 Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Nov 87 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Mr Zagladin: We Must Negotiate a Third Zero Option Very Quickly"]

[Text] Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, left no doubt about the signing of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the INF in his statements on the Radio Luxembourg-*Le Monde* "Grand Jury" program on Sunday 1 November. "A few minor details," still have to be settled, "but they do not change anything," Mr Zagladin said.

Questioned on the reasons for the Soviet about-face on this summit last week, Mr Zagladin dismissed the idea that the Soviet Union had tried to establish a link between the INF agreement and some demands relating to SDI, in other words Star Wars. "There was talk of this link in the past, but the Soviet Union subsequently adopted a stance in favor of signing this agreement separately. This stance is still valid.... We still think that this meeting might be more fruitful if strategic arms and SDI are discussed and results are achieved. This is our conviction. It was expressed very clearly to Mr Shultz by Mr Gorbachev."

The INF agreement, the Soviet leadership member continued, is "an initial step," which "will be all the more important if it is followed by other steps, namely a 50% reduction in strategic weapons and also an agreement on the ABM Treaty." Mr Zagladin admitted that the Soviets think there is a link between an agreement on strategic arsenals and negotiations on Star Wars, but he did not say anything about the nature of this link: "There are many different proposals," he said. "The treaty on strategic forces will have to take account of this link: we will have to find a means of ensuring that it does."

The USSR does not intend to stop here with regard to the reduction of nuclear arms in Europe and is also thinking about the very short-range weapons (with a range of less than 500 km). "We want all missiles to be dismantled," Mr Zagladin said, "and we are prepared to dismantle them all tomorrow. Everything now depends on the West. It is not just we who want to dismantle the short-range missiles, many Europeans, especially in the FRG, want this too. In the coming weeks and months we must very quickly start preliminary talks on these missiles, possibly with a view to a third zero option or another solution. In any event, these missiles must be eliminated and conventional forces reduced." Asked whether, in this connection, the USSR envisages taking account of French weapons of this type, Mr Zagladin replied: "Our position is the same for the time being," and this is implicit confirmation that they will not be taken into account. In addition, Mr Zagladin expressed his disagreement with Francois Mitterrand's statements in the FRG comparing the neutron bomb to conventional weapons.

Although he said he understands the West European countries' desire to defend themselves, Mr Zagladin rejected the way in which they intend to ensure their defense: "It is now impossible to say that security can really be guaranteed with weapons. Security has become a political problem....and the more weapons you have the less secure you are."

UK Paper: INF Treaty Likely To Weaken Needed Deterrence

522500005 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 19 Sep 87 p 8

[Text] This will be remembered as an extraordinary week in the diplomacy of arms control. The meeting between Foreign Secretaries Shultz and Shevardnadze in Washington has yielded an "agreement to agree" not only on the future abolition of intermediate nuclear forces but also on measures to proceed towards the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The former has been Mr Gorbachev's principal foreign policy aim in the year that has elapsed since the sensational Reykjavik summit. The latter has been an aspiration of President Reagan's almost since he entered the White House. Both men have therefore got something of what they wanted.

Exponents of the "twin track" stratagem under which the cruise and Pershing 2 missiles were deployed will welcome the agreement because it delivers the result they sought: the removal of Russia's SS-20 missiles from the European theatre. Thereby it lifts the spectre of attack by a system whose characteristics menaced Europe with a local nuclear war. The European peace movements, of which the Greenham Common women are the most ostentatious representatives, will regard even the partial "agreement to agree" as a vindication of their campaign against cruise and Pershing. And the ordinary citizen who merely hopes to live in a less warlike environment will be heartened by the demonstration that an absolute decrease in the size of the world's nuclear armouries does seem an achievable objective. But the effect of the agreement on special interest groups and on the outlook of the man in the street does not exhaust its implications. There are interest groups quite as dedicated to peace as the Greenham Common women and as ready as the man in the street to share in the general benevolence who will nevertheless question the desirability of what the "agreement to agree" portends. These groups are large and they include all in Western Europe who are concerned for its security and independence outside the Soviet system. They are entitled to consider how the Shultz-Shevardnadze talks affect their concerns. How should they think?

Verification Issue

It is important to emphasise that nothing has been signed or delivered yet. As Sir Geoffrey Howe sagely pointed out yesterday, the Washington agreement is only "the beginning of the beginning" of a new initiative in arms

control. Much work, particularly over the issue of verification, remains to be done before any treaty is concluded. The expectation, nevertheless, must be that treaties will be signed and that their effects will be of major significance for America's Nato partners. Of the two now mooted, the test ban treaty is the less portentous. Its agreement would, however, threaten the future of the British deterrent, since weapons that cannot be tested become useless and all British tests are now carried out at American sites. That is a long-term concern.

In the short term, the removal of intermediate-range forces does not enhance the security of Western Europe. Lord Carrington, Nato's Secretary-General, who gave a cautious welcome to the news of the developments in Washington, conceded that deterrence had worked in Europe before the arrival of cruise and Pershing 2, now slated to disappear under an INF agreement. But he also argued that a more desirable arms control agreement would be one which preserved all levels of deterrence at a lower scale. The INF treaty will not do much to reduce the world-wide scale of nuclear armament but it will abolish a category of weapons altogether from one of the world's strategically critical regions. Those weapons have been widely judged by many Europeans and some hard-headed Americans to be a desirable ingredient of Nato's European deterrence system. Peace is not served by weakening deterrence. As Lord Carrington emphasised, the point of deterrence is to stop wars breaking out, not to fight them. He might also have argued that its point is to buttress the confidence of nations to live as they choose and to strengthen their arm in dealing with neighbours who menace their way of life with the alternative of their own.

Deterrence may be an uncomfortable guarantee of freedom; but even after INF it will still be the best the West has. It is vital that the Shultz-Shevardnadze agreement should not be allowed to weaken those forms of deterrence that will remain or to threaten our essential freedoms.

12913

Dutch Defense Minister on INF Accord, Netherlands' Nuclear Tasks

52002401

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch
21 Sep 87 p 3

[Report on interview with Minister of Defense W. F. Van Eekelen by J.M.Bik: "Nato Will Probably Be Against Curbing of Nuclear Tasks; 'Main Goal of Soviet Union Continues to be to Divide Europe and the United States.'"]

[Text] [Van Eekelen] "My standpoint is that the nuclear strike task of the F-16 and the nuclear depth bombs of the Orion patrol plane of the navy must be retained if there aren't going to be any cruise missiles at Woensdrecht. No doubt the NATO will also determine that; my fellow

ministers of defense and the new NATO commander have already pressed for that previously. Well, afterward the cabinet will have to take a position on that, which is also required by the government accord. At the time, in the fall of '85 when the Dutch decision to place the cruise missiles was made, there was no military reason to terminate those nuclear tasks. And if there aren't going to be any new nuclear arms, those two nuclear tasks should remain, as far as I am concerned."

"If an accord is signed in November by the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of all medium range weapons, the Netherlands must know what is to be done with the Woensdrecht base—whether one should continue to work on a base with potentially a different destination. If a decision is made on that in a NATO context, one won't have to wait until it is ratified by the American Senate, let's say in April '88. Moreover, the cruise missiles weren't going to arrive at Woensdrecht until next summer, and in the United States it has already been announced that no more cruise missiles will be flown to Europe after the ratification of the accord. Woensdrecht will probably appear on the verification list of Soviet inspection teams."

Routine Questions

"The Netherlands, as a deployment country, might be involved in the verification process. But no, I don't really expect any Dutch inspectors to go to the Soviet Union; no doubt that will be an American job."

It is Sunday evening at the home of the busy Minister of Defense Dr W.F. van Eekelen, who has an appointment in Bonn early on Monday morning for a consultation with colleague Worner. He is in the middle of moving; part of the library is in carton boxes in the hallway. During the afternoon he took part in the celebration of the 43rd anniversary of the liberation of Veghel, and in between those activities he appeared in the NOS [Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation] program *Capitool*; moreover he saw a number of other microphones and cameras this past weekend. Routine questions: what will happen to the Woensdrecht base after an accord on elimination of all the missiles in East and West with a range of between 500 and 5000 kilometers (INF)? And what about the two Dutch nuclear tasks which were to disappear if the cruise missiles would have come to Woensdrecht in '88?

As to those nuclear arms tasks, the minister sticks to the line of his party, the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]. Did he notice that his secretary of state, CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] member Van Houwelingen, said on the NCRV [Netherlands Christian Broadcasting Association] radio on Sunday afternoon that to him it does not automatically mean that those two nuclear tasks will be continued? Van Houwelingen called the standpoint of his minister a "personal view" and said that he would prefer to see "personal" decisions

with respect to those tasks and the nuclear task of the artillery dealt with in discussions on the curbing of conventional troops in Europe.

No, the minister hasn't heard about the statements of the secretary of state. He doesn't want to go into the matter either. But just to be sure, he says coolly: "These matters are discussed in the steering group of the prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs and defense." Approvingly he reminds us that in the Capitoool program during the afternoon CDA member J.de Boer and D'66 [Democrats'66] member Van Mierlo expressed themselves as being against relinquishing the F-16 nuclear task at this time. Van Eekelen: "Certain systems which can hit the Soviet Union are disappearing from Europe. With an accord on cruise missiles and SS-20's, the French nuclear force, as well as the nuclear role of the F-16, is gaining importance as it were, certainly if there is going to be a stand-off version" (if the F-16 itself were to become a type of launching base which can fire the long-range arms it carries at Eastern European targets, j.m.b.).

[Question] These days it is said everywhere that the INF accord is merely a beginning, and that the NATO should not engage in further denuclearization in Europe right now, but should first negotiate to decrease the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. The NATO position, with which the VVD was very comfortable, is that the INF accord was able to come into being only because of a sustained individual position, including the placing of INF arms in Western Europe. Aren't the conventional negotiations with the Warsaw Pact being started from a position of weakness; is it logical; is that sequence really all right; what actually is Moscow's interest in this?

[Van Eekelen] "For political reasons, both Gorbachev and Reagan wanted a negotiation success with INF. In my view the military expenditures are not the real issue for Gorbachev; the Soviet military expenditures and production have not decreased, neither has the general threat; in the Soviet Union, just as in the United States, there are plenty of replacement nuclear arms left after an INF accord. We really haven't done enough preparation for negotiations on conventional power ratios in Europe.

"Yes, if you say that after all those years the INF discussions sound rather sloppy, that is true to some extent. But politically it is a difficult matter; as is known, it turned out that opinions among the capital cities are divided. Therefore the NATO now should rapidly, within a few months, develop a conceptual framework.

"The chief goal of the Soviet Union continues to be to divide Western Europe and the United States. Already in advance, I am opposing potential proposals from Moscow to curb only the number of soldiers. In the Soviet Union they are already studying the matter of making the armed forces more efficient with fewer people. Therefore I am warning: with us it must be a matter of tanks, artillery, firepower. In a first phase, for example,

eliminate a number of Soviet and American units, disband them or encamp them behind the Urals and in the United States. But then it should be in a 6-1 ratio, thus let's say 6 or 12 Soviet divisions out of Eastern Europe and 1 or 2 American divisions out of Western Europe. The Western European countries should not participate in that first phase, it is a matter of relations between the Americans and the Soviets. After all, the Western European share in the defense would then increase, and that would also benefit relations with Washington. For that matter, I must also defend our job in the Federal Republic of Germany, and I already have too few reserves in people and firepower."

[Question] And if that negotiating with the Soviet Union doesn't succeed in that way or another one, and the conventional imbalance continues to exist? Then what, and what will you be able to contribute then to eliminate that imbalance through reinforcement? Your own materiel plans are under pressure, your budget increase has just been decreased from 2 to 0.5 percent for 1988 and, moreover, you announced that, within that more limited budget, Defense wants to free 500 million guilders annually for a better personnel policy.

[Van Eekelen] "The budget cut for next year is incidental, and a repetition is not likely. Defense got caught in the inflation adjustment, which is a very disproportionate remedy. After other departments had agreed to that, I had to follow suit. But the principle of 2 percent growth has been retained.

[Question] But Van Mierlo asked you some time ago, albeit in another context, to think more in worst case scenarios. If one can't succeed now in achieving a more conventional balance in Europe via negotiations, and there is no additional money, then won't deterrence via the remaining, shorter-range nuclear arms get a chance again? Thus the "wrong" nuclear arms, according to many?

Van Eekelen's answer makes it clear that the nuclear arms discussion in the Netherlands after an INF accord does not necessarily need to disappear. He once again refers to many other nuclear arms which the United States can still earmark for the defense of Europe after an INF accord, for example intercontinental missiles of American submarines or cruise missiles on ships. And, moreover, he refers to the thinning out and modernizing of tactical nuclear arms decided upon by the NATO in the Canadian Montebello during the period of his predecessor, De Ruiter. In other words: the increase in range of the Lance missile (from 120 to approximately 300 kilometers) and of nuclear artillery (up to about 40 kilometers).

OTTAWA CITIZEN Welcomes Effect of INF Treaty

52200002 Ottawa *THE OTTAWA CITIZEN* in English
19 Sep 87 p B2

[Text] There is a fitting symmetry to the historic U.S.-Soviet treaty to abolish their intermediate-range nuclear forces. It is, after all, a political end to an armory of essentially political weapons.

The INF treaty will hardly alter the East-West military balance. Though it would mean the eradication of hundreds of missiles, it leaves each side's arsenal bristling with thousands of nuclear warheads.

It is the political balance that this treaty changes, and that is appropriate. These INF weapons, Soviet and American, are rooted in politics.

On NATO's side, the deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe was more the outcome of intra-alliance politics than a military response to a military threat. Installation of these INF missiles was first conceived (by Europeans, including Helmut Schmidt) as a way of enforcing the U.S. commitment to defending Europe.

Deployment soon became the focus of an expanding anti-nuclear debate, however, and in 1979 a divided NATO cobbled a compromise: the "two*track" policy of deployment paralleling arms control talks with Moscow.

It can now be argued that the NATO strategy worked. The Soviet Union will indeed dismantle its INF missiles by the terms of this new treaty.

That is all to the good, but for one awkward result. NATO will once more be vulnerable to the strain that brought about deployment in the first place—the uncertainty that the United States would actually risk its own nuclear ruin by reacting to a Soviet attack in Europe with a nuclear strike of its own.

Europeans, naturally enough, are of two minds on this point. On one hand they value the deterrent effect of a U.S. retaliatory threat; on the other hand, Europeans would be the first victims in a nuclear war if that threat were ever exercised. If the risk in this treaty is a renewed political argument within NATO, the great benefit is the promise of better political relations between the superpowers. There is already hope for yet another arms control agreement later, on long-range strategic weapons.

There is also the reopening of negotiations on limiting nuclear testing. Even something short of a complete test ban would be a valuable, confidence-building measure of nuclear stabilization.

There is another and still more welcome effect of the INF treaty: the fragile but growing mutual belief in the Soviet Union and the United States that each can live with the other.

This is not the lamb lying down with the lion; it is two lions learning to survive at close quarters without killing each other.

That, in turn, makes life a little safer for the rest of us.

/12913

Japan's Nakasone Welcomes U.S.-USSR INF Agreement

52600145 Tokyo *KYODO* in English 0012 GMT
19 Sep 87

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 19 KYODO—Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone Saturday welcomed the agreement in principle reached between the United States and Soviet Union to ban intermediate-range nuclear force (INF).

Interviewed by reporters in the early hours Saturday at the Diet building in Tokyo, Nakasone said the agreement was a big step leading to a reduction in other nuclear weapons.

Nakasone welcomed the agreement which includes a ban on INF in Asia as urged by Japan.

Nakasone also said he hopes the environment will now become more conducive to improved Japan-Soviet relations.

/9738

Austrian Paper on Consequences of Zero Option

52002410 Vienna *DIE PRESSE* in German
19/20 Sep 87 p 5

[Commentary by Georg Possanner: "Disarmament: Longing Makes a Weak Negotiator. The Zero Option Is Coming, the Nuclear Danger Remains"; first paragraph is *DIE PRESSE* introduction]

[Text] The talks between the foreign ministers of the superpowers were held this week amid virtual euphoria, ending yesterday with a meeting with President Reagan and an agreement to start talks before 1 December on giving up underground nuclear tests. Western public opinion sees almost only the positive aspects while European military experts remain skeptical: In time of crisis the absence of the Pershings would not, as many think, reduce the danger of nuclear first use but rather increase it. And that on battlefields where it would not be possible to differentiate clearly between West and East or between the territory of the alliances and that of the uninvolved neutrals.

The more optimistic the sounds reaching European ears recently from Washington and Moscow, the more euphoria and doubt spread across the old continent in equal measure. The news heralded an imminent historic agreement by the superpowers to do away with intermediate-range nuclear missiles completely and thus clear the way for a superpower summit this year yet. Party boss Gorbachev went so far as to raise the prospect of an agreement in spring 1988 to halve the number of strategic intercontinental missiles, apparently for the first time without tying this to limits on America's Star Wars project. In other words such a treaty could be signed during President Reagan's return visit next year.

Relations between the two superpowers, and thus the East-West relationship, are starting to take on a new quality that calls not just for a rethinking of security policy. The way both sides raced into the final stretch in the Geneva negotiations proves that it is not only Ronald Reagan to whom a political success is a matter of pressing importance. For Gorbachev a treaty and summit meeting with the U.S. President would be an almost perfect accompaniment to the celebrations for the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution in 6 weeks. The imminent elimination of an entire category of nuclear systems is cause for joy to those who on principle view weapons, much less nuclear ones, as an evil and therefore immediately view any disarmament treaty, regardless of its merits, as a positive step.

Many Europeans Are Concerned That Decoupling Is Already Underway

No fewer in number are those who consider this step militarily questionable but politically unavoidable: they are filled with concern. First there is the question of whether the American nuclear security guarantee for Europe has not been watered down after all. To put it another way: are the risk to Europe and the risk to America not being decoupled when only intercontinental nuclear arsenals and tactical weapons remain, but nothing which from European soil threatens the Soviet Union, the sole power possessing the capability for an attack on the West? U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger just recently pointed out once again that the strongest tie between the United States and its allies is the 326,000 soldiers stationed in Europe. There is no question of even a partial withdrawal, he said. And yet there is reason for skepticism.

There is also the uncertainty as to whether President Reagan is not after all asking an unprepared Europe to kick the nuclear habit sooner than its security—which in the final analysis it has entrusted to American missiles—permits. No less a matter of concern for Europe is the uncertainty as to where the next disarmament steps will lead: What comes after the double zero option?

The superpowers are concentrating on strategic weapons with the goal of eliminating 50 percent of them. Naturally the Europeans wonder whether it would not be

better for their security first to tackle conventional arms and nuclear systems with a range of up to 500 kilometers. Nobody knows what trick Gorbachev has up his sleeve in the disarmament arena. Is the denuclearization of Europe not his goal?

The latest developments have made America's allies realize concretely for the first time how little they count for. Not even the intense process of transatlantic consultation can hide that. It was Michel Tatu who described it most aptly in *LE MONDE* not long ago: "The protectee is as little able to dictate his protector's disarmament requirements as he is to stipulate his defense against the views of his protector." This was obvious with Federal Chancellor Kohl's Pershing decision, which removed the last great obstacle to a missile agreement.

The doubters pose the only question that is relevant: Does the plan to scrap all nuclear intermediate-range nuclear systems with a range of 500- 5500 kilometers increase European security, leave it unchanged, or actually decrease it? To judge from the hard data, the answer is clear: The nuclear threat to Europe decreases only to a minor degree; a mere three percent of total warheads will be eliminated. The actual significance of the agreement lies in the huge signal sent by the disappearance of an entire category of weapons and by the asymmetrical reductions—the Soviets would destroy twice as many weapons as the United States. Politicians like Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans may make bold to say in this connection, as in his interview with *DIE PRESSE*, that a policy without risks is a policy without a chance. The military expert who was asked by political leaders whether he could still fulfill his task of defending Europe with the double zero option as decided on has responded with only a conditional "yes." General John Galvin, NATO supreme commander and thus commander of 326,000 U.S. soldiers in Europe and all European troops subordinated to the defensive alliance, made his view clear during a large-scale exercise in the FRG: If there is no decisive, qualitative improvement in the remaining nuclear systems and conventional arms, he would have to demand the release of nuclear weapons at an early stage of a conflict. In plain English the supreme commander was saying that the loss without replacement of an essential link in the chain of nuclear deterrence called "flexible response," along with the chronic conventional deficiencies, increases the danger that nuclear weapons will be used to fight a war rather than as instruments of war prevention as in the past. Why?

The great deterrent value of the American intermediate-range missiles vis-a- vis the SS20's and the tank masses of the Warsaw Pact—frighteningly superior in numbers—lies in the fact that they are directed solely at targets in the Soviet Union. What now remains in continental Europe and is known as "tactical" nuclear weapons reaches only into the other Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Of course nuclear-armed submarines still cruise off the coasts of Europe and there are

nuclear bombers. Still, they are not a comparable substitute. Gorbachev quickly recognized that, which explains some of his concessions in recent months. Moscow can very well give up intermediate-range missiles as long as the parity in strategic, intercontinental weapons remains and in particular as long as the Warsaw Pact preserves its conventional superiority in Europe.

What the NATO supreme commander was saying with his frank warning was that Western public opinion has not adequately understood the connection between weakness in conventional defense and the need for early first use of nuclear weapons as a way to avoid capitulation. In a widely-noted speech this year in Brussels, Sam Nunn, the influential chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee, attributed this lack of understanding to the media, among others, because 95 percent of media time and space is given over to nuclear weapons. Brussels defense experts therefore by no means rule out the possibility that the euphoria over the imminent missile agreement might even lead to a call for unbalanced conventional disarmament on the part of the West.

The current mood clearly favors Gorbachev's goal of denuclearizing Europe with no quid pro quo on his part. The ethical questioning of nuclear deterrent in the West, not least because of U.S. President Reagan's arguments for his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as Star Wars, has further increased the allergy to nuclear weapons. Parallel to this there has come to be less understanding that in order to repel a conventional attack by superior forces, NATO would have to resort to nuclear weapons quite soon after the aggression was launched. It should therefore be no surprise if the demand for no first use which the Soviets have propagated for years should gain yet more in popularity as soon as the missile agreement is in hand. It will be more difficult even than hitherto to make it clear that only uncertainty about possible use of nuclear weapons by the West prevents the threat from and blackmail by the tank masses of the East.

In the West People Ignore the Connection Between the Nuclear Threat and Defensive Weakness

The long-range defense program adopted in 1979 by the Atlantic Alliance still has not been completely met; this will be even more serious once intermediate-range missiles are eliminated. In this program the United States obligated itself in case of war to send six army divisions and more than 1500 warplanes to Europe within 10 days. Former NATO Supreme Commander Rogers judged at the time that he could not hold out long enough with conventional means for the American reinforcements to arrive: too few ammunition stockpiles, too few hardened hangers for aircraft, too little gasoline, logistical problems.

There have been improvements since then. Gen Galvin, however, believes that in order to carry out his political task of preventing war it is necessary to increase the capability of tactical nuclear weapons not included in the present agreement as well as to provide long-range aircraft-launched nuclear missiles to compensate for the Pershing and Cruise Missiles. Equally urgent in his opinion is the need to modernize conventional armaments.

A glance at the map of Europe and at NATO's Bold Sparrow maneuver area in southern Germany (it assumes that the East "violates Austria's neutrality without sanctions") will show that the Alpine Republic too should be concerned about the imminent strategic changes in the superpower relationship. Since the conventional component in European armed forces will further increase after a superpower missile agreement, the agreement also has indirect consequences for the neutrals between the two blocs. It is even less adequate than before to play the role of interested bystander. When the supreme commander of the North Atlantic Alliance is afraid that after the elimination of nuclear weapons directed against the Soviet Union from NATO soil he will have to call for nuclear battlefield weapons at an early stage, then Austria too ought to pay heed.

For instance, in the purely theoretical case of an East-West conflict, the neutral's defensive capability might be calculated and an attack launched through Austria. Despite resistance by the Federal Army, this performance would soon result in a confrontation between the pacts on our territory. Who can state with certainty that NATO would not use nuclear weapons outside alliance territory before launching them from German soil against the Germans of the other state?

This is what the treaty looks like now. On the eve of his meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze this week, U.S. President Reagan modified his negotiating position once again and thus moved closer to Moscow's proposals, partly against the wishes of Defense Secretary Weinberger. The new offer calls for the elimination of all intermediate-range missiles over a period of 3 years, regardless of whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads. This move of Reagan's sped up the pace considerably. In addition, the Pentagon had wanted to leave open the option of retrofitting some missiles for non-nuclear systems. Short-range missiles are to be dismantled within a year.

Also called for are a ban on any modernization, new production, or flight tests of such weapons. The United States is now prepared to accept the Soviet demand that all missiles be scrapped at precisely agreed-on sites under joint supervision. Originally the U.S. Air Force wanted to retain some Cruise Missiles and destroy them in flight tests for Reagan's Star Wars project.

In these battles over negotiating positions and haggling over the fine print in the treaty texts, the Soviets have just demanded the destruction of warheads whose vehicles would be destroyed under the agreement. This involves the German Pershing 1A nuclear warheads which are kept under American control as well as the 400 warhead inventory kept in the United States. The Americans described this as an "artificial obstacle" since it is scarcely possible to monitor the destruction of warheads. A compromise is being worked out.

The two sides are working feverishly on the vital question of verification. This has led in the last stage of the disarmament poker party to a grotesque situation in which the United States is calling for a less rigorous verification mechanism than the historically secretive Soviets. This is due to the fact that Moscow has agreed that each superpower not be allowed to retain 100 intermediate-range missiles in Asia or the Soviet Union respectively. This considerably simplifies verification. In addition, Americans are eager to monitor Soviet weapons plants but are not at all happy at the idea that Moscow's experts could suddenly stick their noses into top secret weapon factories in California or Illinois; this led a looser inspection regime which Moscow now is complaining about.

Anybody Who Believes That Austria Is Outside Any Danger Area Is Terribly Mistaken

There is no doubt that it was Chancellor Kohl's decision on the Pershings and the recent modification of the U.S. negotiating position which brought an agreement within reach. Nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that it was the Atlantic Alliance's united stand and its staying power in building up its strength that brought the Soviets back

to the negotiating table in the first place and then, to the great amazement of a totally unprepared NATO, caused the Soviets to make the major concessions that justified modifying the U.S. position.

It is virtually certain that after intensive debate on the military pro's and con's the U.S. Senate will ratify the treaty signed by President Reagan. There will be no repetition of the shameful fate of the SALT II agreement, signed by Jimmy Carter in 1979 in Vienna and then never submitted because of disillusionment over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There are several reasons for this.

First of all, the majority Democrats in the Senate cannot afford to reject a popular disarmament treaty in an election year. Even if conservative supporters are disappointed at the "softening" of their hero, who once described the Soviet Union as the "evil empire," even they do not believe that a Ronald Reagan would let himself be seduced into a treaty from credulity, for which Carter was criticized. It is obvious that the rush to reach an agreement quickly is due to the desire to relegate "Irangate" to oblivion and to go down in history as a "peace president." To conclude from this that dangerous concessions are being made is unjustified.

Nonetheless views as to the consequences of such a treaty vary widely. The hearings promise to offer a tough debate. Historically-minded senators will remember once again the legacy, as it were, bequeathed by Winston Churchill in his last speech to the joint houses of Congress: "Above all else, be cautious and do not abandon nuclear weapons until you are certain, no, more than certain, that you have other means to preserve peace."

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Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Conference Ends

'Groundwork Laid'

LD301729 Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT
30 Oct 87

[Text] Prague October 30 TASS—The Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states whose meeting closed here on Thursday adopted a document "Apropos of Increasing the Efficiency of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament."

The Warsaw Treaty member states, the document points out, attach fundamental importance to achieving the maximum efficiency of the entire existing system of disarmament talks. A special place belongs to the Geneva conference on disarmament.

The states represented at the meeting of the committee suggested concentrating efforts of the conference on disarmament on the following highly important tasks.

Concluding the drafting of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

Advancing to a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban.

The Warsaw Treaty member states believe that the Conference on Disarmament has laid down a good groundwork for the practical and purposeful work to prevent the arms race in outer space.

They propose to thoroughly discuss at the third special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament all aspects of the work of the conference on disarmament with the aim of enhancing its efficiency.

The Warsaw Treaty member states come out in favour of outlining ways and means of increasing the real results from the talks at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

At the same time they find it expedient for all states, not participating in the Conference on Disarmament, to be given an opportunity to make their contribution to its work. In their opinion, the in the future conference could become a permanent universal instrument of talks on disarmament.

Ministers Adopt Arms Document

LD301755 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT
30 Oct 87

[Text] Prague October 30 TASS—Follows the text of a document adopted by the foreign ministers' committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states at its meeting here on October 28 and 29:

Apropos of Increasing the Efficiency of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament [subhead]

Proceeding from the firm conviction that a lasting peace and reliable security for all can be ensured only by political means, the Warsaw Treaty member states attach fundamental importance to achieving the maximum efficiency of the entire existing system of disarmament talks. The talks on security and disarmament—both bilateral and multilateral—should focus on the issues of bridling the nuclear arms race and bringing about nuclear disarmament. It is essential to activate the efforts of all states towards creating a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

A special place in these efforts belongs to the Geneva conference on disarmament, in which states of all continents and of different socio-economic systems, members of military-political alliances, non-aligned and neutral countries, all nuclear powers and also non-nuclear countries are taking part on an equal footing.

The multilateral forum has proved that given the political will of states, it can act as an organ for concrete, productive talks for working out measures and accords in the field of disarmament. It takes credit for such international legal acts of significance as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the biological weapons convention, and the convention on the prohibition of military use of environmental modification techniques.

At the same time the results of work by the Geneva forum over recent years have been far from fully meeting the demands of the times.

At this juncture in the work of the conference on disarmament the states represented at the meeting suggest concentrating efforts on the following highly important tasks.

Concluding the drafting of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The Warsaw Treaty member states regard an early prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons as one of the principal objectives of their foreign policy. In this connection they call attention again to their Moscow statement of March 1987 and other important initiatives. Work on the convention is at the final stage. There is every possibility to carry it through to a successful outcome as early as in the near future. The states represented at the meeting are prepared to cooperate constructively with their partners at the talks also in the future in the name of overcoming the remaining obstacles, so as to embark on a complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial basis for their production everywhere as early as in the near future.

Advancing to a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban. The Warsaw Treaty member states view the termination and general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon testing as a priority on the path of curbing the nuclear arms race and as a step that can dependably plug the

channels for upgrading nuclear weapons. In this context they call attention to the document "key provisions of a treaty on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon testing" tabled at the conference on disarmament in June 1987 and suggest forming a special group of scientific experts for an early preparation of practical proposals for a system to verify abstention from nuclear testing. The drafting of such a treaty within the framework of the conference on disarmament and full-scale Soviet-American talks on limiting nuclear testing and eventually stopping it altogether will mutually supplement each other and lead to a common goal. They are prepared constructively to consider any other proposals and considerations towards resolving the issue as soon as possible.

The Warsaw Treaty member states believe that the conference on disarmament has laid down a good groundwork for the practical and purposeful work to prevent the arms race in outer space. The socialist countries have put forward concrete proposals on this issue.

The states, represented at the meeting, stress the need to step up the work of the conference in other important directions as well, with due account taken of relevant resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly, which express the will of the overwhelming majority of the world's states.

They propose to thoroughly discuss at the third special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament all aspects of the work of the conference on disarmament with the aim of enhancing its efficiency.

The Warsaw Treaty member states come out in favour of joining efforts in the spirit of constructive and nonconfrontational dialogue to outline ways and means of increasing the real results from the talks at the conference on disarmament in Geneva. They propose to discuss and coordinate the following practical measures:

First, to introduce a more intensive timetable at the conference so that it could function throughout the year, adjourning two or three times. To agree to make the auxiliary bodies of the conference, in keeping with its general mandate, function until the completion of its work rather than on a yearly basis.

Second, to more actively draw experts and scientific centres in different countries into the elaboration of problems facing the conference. To practise more widely the creation, of necessity, of expert teams in relevant areas. To consider the question of drawing at different forums, primarily by creating a consultative council at the conference, of well-known scientists and public figures in a search for solutions to the most complex problems of disarmament facing the conference, and of timely recognising long-term factors which are crucial for strengthening security.

Third, by agreement between the participants in the conference, to hold meetings at foreign ministers' level during highly crucial moments, including when difficulties of principle arise during talks. Meetings with the participation of ministers would give a positive impulse to the process of such important talks.

The Warsaw Treaty member states find it expedient for all states, not participating in the conference on disarmament, to be given an opportunity to make their contribution to its work. In their opinion, the conference could become a permanent universal instrument of talks on disarmament.

The states, represented at the meeting, note that the talks on security and disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral, mutually supplement and enrich each other.

The Warsaw Treaty member states state their readiness to constructively take part in considering and implementing all concrete proposals, irrespective of where they came from, aimed at intensifying and stepping up the efficiency of the conference on disarmament.

Soviet General Describes Disarmament Strategy

Press Conference in Bonn

*LD031606 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Nov 87*

[Text] Bonn 3 Nov (TASS)—A press conference held today in Bonn by the Max Planck Society was devoted to issues of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. The results of a 2-day seminar on these issues, in which military experts from the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact took part, were summed up. Taking part on the Soviet side was Colonel General N.F. Chervov, head of a department of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

Speaking at the press conference, he stressed that the Soviet strategy of disarmament, set out by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his statement of 15 January 1986 and in his subsequent speeches, provides for a broad advance in all direction: the elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, the banning of nuclear tests, the blocking of weapons deployment in space, as well as a radical cut in conventional armaments.

The military potentials of both groupings, he emphasized, must be cut, and the structures of their armed forces changed so that neither side holds the capability of attacking and carrying out offensive operations. The Warsaw Pact is ready to discuss this issue with NATO. Now that agreement has been reached on a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting and on the conclusion of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, the chances of solving these issues have grown.

Various proposals were put forward at the seminar on the establishment of ceilings for conventional weapons which sufficient for defense. At the same time, a desire on the part of the NATO experts has been discovered not to include naval and air forces in the arms reduction process. This would give NATO unilateral advantages and would create a threat to the Warsaw Pact countries.

DPA Notes Comments

LD031310 Hamburg DPA in German 1142 GMT
3 Nov 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in the view of Colonel General Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, head of the arms control department at the Soviet Defense Ministry, should reduce their weapons globally to such an extent "that an attack capability no longer exists." Certain upper limits in military potentials should be created which provided only for a defense capability, Chervov said during the introduction of a research project "Stability-Orientated Security Policy" of the Max Planck Society and the German Research Society in Bonn on Tuesday.

The structures of the two alliances, in the view of Chervov, should be changed in such a manner that "offensive operations by both sides can be excluded". Nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons should be removed altogether. "Only by excluding nuclear weapons can a guarantee for security be established." This is the position of the Soviet Union, Chervov underlined. Figures have not yet been mentioned concerning specific upper limits. The USSR is prepared to talk about this with NATO experts. "We are prepared to conduct such talks on the basis of equality."

According to the project leader, Albrecht von Mueller, high-ranking civilian and military experts from NATO and the Warsaw Pact have cooperated in this research project. Von Mueller emphasized to journalists that a stability-orientated security policy can, for instance, provide for identical upper limits in East and West for heavy tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and helicopter gunships, and tactical aircraft. These upper limits should be markedly lower than the level of the side which at present is at a numerical disadvantage.

USSR: Pact, NATO Representatives Meet in Vienna

LD021148 Moscow TASS in English 1130 GMT
2 Nov 87

[Text] Vienna November 2 TASS—A regular meeting of the representatives of the Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO was held here today to work out a mandate of the future negotiations on armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

The representatives of socialist countries drew attention to the call by the meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states to

expedite the reaching of accords that would make it possible to pass over to practical talks on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals with account of the security interests of all

USSR: WW II Battle Viewed From Current Defense Doctrine

18160012g Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 8, Aug 87 (signed to press 17 Jul 87) pp 32-40

[Article by A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov: "The Battle of Kursk in the Light of Contemporary Defense Doctrine"]

[Text] One of the greatest engagements of WWII—the battle of Kursk—at which the offensive strategy of Hitler's Wehrmacht finally foundered, took place 44 years ago. The Kursk victory and the breakout of Soviet forces toward the Dnepr were the culmination of a fundamental turning point in the course of the war. Nazi Germany and its allies were forced onto the defensive in all theaters.

In this battle defense, as the most economical method of operations, demonstrated the possibility of obtaining the maximum advantages thanks to the increased weight of fire, of antitank weapons particularly, and obstacles, including antitank mines, and successful resistance to the most powerful tank penetration forces.

This is why the Kursk engagement represents an exceptionally important example in the history of wars and military art from the viewpoint of the dialectics of the confrontation of means of attack and defense and the correlation of the possibilities of an offensive and defense.

Ascertainment of the profound historical regularities in this sphere is an important reference component for contemporary military-political research, an analysis of questions of arms limitation and disarmament and the increased stability of the military-strategic balance (strategic stability) and, consequently, is most directly related to the problem of the prevention of war both under current conditions and, possibly, in a post-nuclear era and the question of a reduction in conventional arms, in the course of which, as the Warsaw Pact states propose, there would be the diminished possibility of surprise attack and the launch of offensive operations (1). A lowering of the levels of military confrontation and the consolidation of stability in the sphere of conventional armed forces, particularly in Europe, is an essential condition of profound reductions in nuclear arms and the increased stability of the military-strategic balance at this level also.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that the potential of conventional armed forces also must be lowered to the limits of a reasonable sufficiency, that is, to the level necessary for tackling only defensive tasks.

The question of military doctrines is of considerable importance for an evaluation of the real intentions of military-political groupings, as of individual states also. The Warsaw Pact countries emphasize that in the interests of security in Europe and throughout the world the military concepts and doctrines of military alliances should be based solely on defensive principles. This makes the corresponding demands on strategy and tactics. The exclusively defensive nature of military doctrines presupposes corresponding measures in the sphere of the organizational development of the armed forces, including questions of their numerical strength, structure, arms, deployment, combat training and indoctrination of the personnel and military planning.

The extensive and harsh experience of WWII, despite the changes in the technology of conventional arms which have occurred since 1945, should be taken into consideration in full here.

The document "Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States," which was signed by the leaders of the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact in Berlin on 29 May 1987, is a demonstration of adherence to the idea of "exclusive defense". It observes, *inter alia*, that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact as a whole and of each of its participants is subordinated to the task of the prevention of war—both nuclear and conventional; it proceeds from the fact that under present conditions the choice of the military option for solving any contentious question is impermissible (2).

Particularly indicative in this respect is the place in the document which touches on methods of realization of the defensive essence of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries at the strategy and tactics level. It says there that the socialist states propose as a principal goal a reduction in Europe in armed and conventional arms to a level "...whereat neither side would in providing for its defense have the means for a surprise attack against the other side and for the development of offensive operations in general" (3).

This high-minded position presupposes certain changes in the way of thinking of military professionals. It cannot, obviously, fail to entail a reconsideration of a number of generally accepted postulates of military theory and practice. Specifically, the still current belief that only a "decisive offensive leads to victory" no longer extends to nuclear war. What kind of victory would it be, advancing across a devastated death zone?

Certain aspects of historical experience, primarily the experience of the recent past—the history of WWII—and the intrinsic regularities of armed struggle require a reinterpretation also. The correlation of defense and an offensive and their advantages and shortcomings appears differently in the nuclear age than hitherto.

The reorienting of military doctrines proposed for wide-ranging discussion between the Warsaw Pact and NATO should also be underpinned by practical steps in the sphere of a reduction in offensive types of arms most suitable for a surprise attack and the prohibition thereof.

The comprehensive plan of a reduction in arms and a deepening of trust in Central Europe (the "Jaruzelski Plan") put forward on 8 May 1987 by the Polish leadership operates in this direction. It provides, in particular, for the gradual withdrawal from this region and a jointly agreed reduction in conventional arms, primarily those possessing the maximum power and accuracy and capable of serving a surprise attack, and a change in the nature of military doctrines such that they may be mutually recognized as exclusively defensive.

The existence of huge arsenals of nuclear weapons on the sides confronting one another does not preclude the possibility of combat operations being conducted with the use only of conventional weapons. At the present stage of the development of warfare there has been a refinement of the first speculative evaluations connected with the appearance of nuclear weapons, operations using conventional weapons are recognized as probable and many traditional categories and principles of operational art have been rehabilitated.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, notes the following in this connection: "Recognizing the inevitability of a retaliatory nuclear strike and its catastrophic consequences, our probable adversaries have in recent years been paying special attention to the development of conventional weapons systems with higher yield, range and accuracy specifications. Simultaneously they have also been upgrading methods of unleashing military operations with the use of conventional weapons.... Soviet military science is leaving none of these enemy actions unattended. We are taking these trends into consideration both in the training of the troops (forces) and in control thereof" (4).

What was the essence of the intention of the Soviet Supreme Command in the summer-fall campaign of 1943, which had been initiated by the battle of Kursk?

The spring of 1943 had passed. The Wehrmacht's affairs on the Soviet-German Front had taken a difficult turn. Behind it was the crushing defeat at Stalingrad. The overall correlation of forces had taken shape in favor of the Red Army, despite the success which Group of Armies "South" had managed to achieve in March 1943 at Kharkov. Despite all the most severe losses in people and equipment sustained by the Soviet Union in the preceding years of the war and the loss of a number of most important industrial centers, Soviet armed forces prior to the battle of Kursk were already superior to Hitler's forces on the Eastern Front in a number of

indicators. The superefforts which had been made by the party and the entire people to mobilize industry, agriculture and human resources for the needs of the war had borne fruit.

But even in such a manifestly disadvantageous situation Hitler, after agonized hesitation, resolved to carry out the powerful offensive Operation Citadel in the central sector of the Soviet-German Front to encircle and wipe out the main forces of the Red Army. The strategic and political aim of the operation, like the entire summer campaign of 1943 on the Eastern Front, was the subject of keen debate in Germany's military-political leadership. There was a clash of the most diverse, at times, opposite opinions. The term "standoff" figured in the evaluations even at the first stage of the formation of the new plan. It was linked with vague hopes of achieving peace with the Soviet Union, having exhausted its offensive possibilities by way of defense. Supporters of this approach were Jodl, chief of staff of the Wehrmacht Operations Command, and Admiral Doenitz. Field Marshal Manstein, commander of Group of Armies "South," proposed a plan for the extermination of the southern flank of Soviet forces (were they to advance) primarily by means of mobile strategic defense.

The Army General Staff believed that immediately following the flood season period the Red Army would right away switch to active operations to liberate the occupied oblasts. Its intentions in summary form amounted to preempting the attacks of Soviet forces, choosing an auspicious moment and switching to a counteroffensive, in the course of which inflicting a major defeat on the enemy and weakening it to the utmost. Certain top officers of the Army General Staff hoped to thus regain the lost initiative. This viewpoint was also shared by Field Marshal Kluge, commander of Group of Armies "Center". Manstein was ultimately disposed toward it also.

Together with this British and American forces' invasion of Italy and France even was expected, and a big victory in the East would have permitted the release of part of the forces to reinforce positions in the West.

Mobile defense was emphatically rejected by Hitler and a number of representatives of the Army General Staff: Germany's most acute military-economic requirements, they believed, did not allow under any conditions a risk of losing the Donbass and the resources of the Ukraine.

Hitler and the Army General Staff were still in the grip of the impression made by the triumphant armored breakthroughs of the first years of the war, when mobile forces constituted powerful, if not decisive, offensive potential. This inclined them in favor of the idea of the need to attack first to thwart a possible Red Army offensive in the Ukraine. Gambling on a preemptive attack, they also proceeded from the fact that the Wehrmacht would at any moment have to begin a fight on two fronts.

Inasmuch as the forces which could be allocated for an offensive were limited, the Kursk bulge was chosen as the most suitable sector. It was contemplated here wiping out the forces within the arc and smashing the Red Army reserves east of Kursk, which, as the Wehrmacht Operations Command Staff believed, not without reason, were intended for a summer offensive. Removal of the arc would bring about a reduction in the front by 370 km and the possibility subsequently of releasing up to 18-20 divisions and maintaining the reserves. By this attack the Red Army would be deprived of a starting point for an offensive against the flank of Group of Armies "South" in the direction of the Dnepr or against the rear of the Orel arc, that is, of Group of Armies "Center"; the success could then have been developed.

What had Hitler to rely on?

A gamble was made on a decisive concentration of forces and resources. Despite the general correlation in the Kursk bulge area, which was unfavorable to the Wehrmacht, a pronounced preponderance of forces was achieved thanks to the concentration of forces in narrow sectors north and south of Kursk. On the northern side of the bulge it constituted in terms of people 12:1, in terms of tanks and assault guns, 11:1. On the southern side, in the sector of the main attack, the German-fascist command had achieved superiority in all indicators: people, artillery, tanks and engineer troops.

Big hopes were placed in surprise and, the main thing, the lightning speed of the operations: in 2 days forces of the northern and southern assault groupings were to have linked up east of Kursk, and by the close of the fourth day, to have completed the operation. It was anticipated that the Soviet command would not have time to bring up the necessary forces to the breakthrough sectors and parry the assaults.

Finally, the Hitler command considered virtually the main factor of success of Operation Citadel the expected arrival by the start of the summer of 1943 of a large quantity of military equipment which was new to the Wehrmacht and, consequently, its enemy: the Tiger T-VI heavy tanks, Panzer T-V medium tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled heavy assault guns and such.

According to the yardsticks of that time, this was formidable weaponry. It was considerably superior in terms of its tactical-engineering specifications to the weapons systems with which the Wehrmacht had attacked our country (T-III and T-IV medium tanks, for example) and which had in the majority of operations successfully overcome the Red Army's defenses in the summer of 1941 and 1942.

The front and turret armor of these tanks and self-propelled guns were not pierced by 45-mm cannon—the main antitank weapon of Soviet infantry. Antitank rocket launchers were practically powerless against them also. The German Tiger T-VI heavy tank weighed 57

tons and had a maximum speed of up to 40 kph, which was not inferior to that of KV-1 and KV-1s heavy Soviet tanks, but was superior to them in thickness of armor and armament. In terms of these parameters the Panzer T-V medium tank was roughly equal to the KV-1 heavy tank (5), but superior to the latter in terms of speed. The Soviet IS heavy tank—the most powerful combat vehicle of WWII—began to be received only in the fall of 1943, after the battle of Kursk, and the T-34 medium tank was inferior to the Panzer in thickness of front armor (6), but superior to it in terms of speed and maneuverability; the caliber of their guns was approximately identical. Granted all this, the Red Army was manifestly inferior in the numbers of heavy tanks which had been produced by the start of the battle and which had been mustered in this area.

In terms of a number of indicators the German Ferdinand assault guns were superior to the Soviet SU guns of the same class—the SU-122 and the ISU-152.

German-fascist aviation had not by the summer of 1943 lost its domination in the air. German aviation industry had maintained its capacity for creating new models of engineering. Specifically, by the start of the battle of Kursk the Focke-Wulf-190A with a speed of 625 kph and armed with two 20-mm cannon and two machineguns and the Henschel-129 ground-attack aircraft had appeared in the skies.

Thus technically the Hitlerites were thoroughly prepared for the offensive. Altogether 50 divisions, 16 of which armored and motorized, were earmarked for the penetration attack in the Kursk sector. This was the "color" of the Wehrmacht—the "Adolf Hitler," "Death's Head" and "Das Reich" SS armored divisions and the motorized "Greater Germany". The northern assault grouping had approximately 1,200 tanks and assault guns, the southern, 1,500. Over 65 percent of the aircraft at the disposal of the Wehrmacht and its allies on the Soviet-German Front were earmarked for participation in Operation Citadel.

The Soviet command directed to this sector of the front all five tank armies available at this time, 15 armored and mechanized corps and a multitude of individual regiments and brigades. And T-70 light tanks constituted a significant portion of armored resources, what is more. On the Voronezh and Central fronts they constituted almost one-third of the total number of vehicles. In addition, our tank armies had only just been formed, and the formation of the 4th Tank Army was altogether completed only by the start of the counteroffensive.

Although the Red Army disposed in the Kursk sector of no fewer forces than the Wehrmacht and in terms of a number of indicators was superior to it even, General Headquarters, abandoning the idea of an offensive at the first stage of the campaign, adopted an original plan of premeditated defense. This was the first occasion in the history of wars and military art when the most powerful

side switched to the defensive. As is known, the classical formula of military art proclaims: defense is the stronger form of military operations, and for this reason recourse to it is had by the weakest (7).

In this case it was proved how advantageous reliable defense is even under conditions of superiority. Of course, the gamble here was made on guaranteed anti-tank defenses, that is, such a reserve of strength was created as to have created the confidence that the enemy would not succeed in disrupting operational liaison between its components, creating a breach that would be hard to fill and breaking through the strategic front.

An author of this original idea was Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov (8). It seemed to the supreme commander so daring and unusual that it took him a long time to resolve to support it.

Of course, not being a professional in questions of military strategy and operational art, I.V. Stalin could not have foreseen with such confidence as Zhukov the outcome of a defensive engagement, the less so in that in the summer of 1941 the length of the front and in the summer of 1942 on the southwest strategic axis Soviet forces' defenses had failed to withstand the onslaught of the German offensive.

It has to be noted that in 1941 it was manifestly insufficient attention to questions of strategic defense and Stalin's incorrect assessment of the direction of the Wehrmacht's main thrust which had led to heavy defeats of the Red Army and the loss of vast territory of our country.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War Soviet military theory had elaborated insufficiently the forms and methods of conducting a strategic defense: conducting a defense on an operational-strategic scale had been worked up extremely inadequately in practice, and the provision with antitank weapons was insufficient. A most difficult task which the supreme command had to tackle in the very first days of the war was the organization and conducting of strategic defense. A readiness to repulse aggression demanded not only the elaboration of plans of defensive operations but also their preparation in full, including the logistical and engineering aspects, in order for them to be assimilated by the commanders and staffs. An important part in holding on to the lines which were occupied and draining the assault groupings of the advancing enemy was played by the skillful concentration of forces and resources in the decisive sectors of the defenses of the fronts and armies. Application of this principle at the start of the Great Patriotic War was in practice lacking in the majority of instances (9).

The idea of the indispensable transference of the war at the very start thereof to enemy territory (an idea, furthermore, substantiated neither scientifically, neither by an analysis of the strategic situation nor by operational

calculations) so carried away certain leading political and military figures that the possibility of conducting operations on their own territory was practically ruled out. This had a very negative effect on the preparation not only of the defenses but also the military theaters deep in their own territory. "The underestimation of defense and the not entirely correct evaluation of the changed nature of the initial period of the war had more serious consequences than is usually portrayed in military literature," Col Gen M.A. Gareyev rightly observes (10).

Yet due attention had been paid to questions of strategic defense by a number of important theorists in Soviet military thought of an earlier period. They were elaborated comprehensively, in particular, in the fundamental works of A.A. Svechin, A.I. Verkhovskiy (11) and others.

So the idea of premeditated defense was accepted not without hesitation. But when it had been consented to in General Headquarters (this happened at the meeting on 12 April 1943, almost 3 months prior to the start of the battle), the task of guaranteeing the strength of the defenses and their insuperability was made paramount. Eight defensive zones and lines of a total depth of up to 300 km were fitted out for this comparatively quickly in the Kursk bulge area.

Each army of the first echelon built three zones. They were all occupied by troops in the likely directions of the enemy's main thrusts. In addition, the Central and Voronezh fronts, which were defending the Kursk arc, erected three front-line defensive lines. East of the bulge General Headquarters placed its strategic reserve—the Steppe Front—which prepared its own line along the Rossosnoye—Kolodez line. The official line of defense was constructed along the east bank of the River Don.

Engineer preparation of the defenses took almost 3 months—a luxury which the army had obtained only once throughout the war. The troops prepared a developed system of trenches and full-section communication trenches. There were an average of up to 170 km of trenches per division.

The defenses were prepared primarily as antitank defenses. The basis thereof were antitank strong points and areas, which in the tank-threat directions were constructed the entire depth of the armies' defenses. The maneuvering of artillery-antitank reserves and mobile obstacle-building detachments was provided for also. The density of the antitank artillery constituted up to 23 guns per 1 km of the front. A solid zone of obstacles of all types: ditches, dragons' teeth, minefields and dams for flooding the terrain were created in the tank-threat directions before the forward edge. Troops of the Central Front, for example, had installed in the period April-June up to 400,000 mortar shells and land mines.

Never before in the history of wars and defensive constructions had antitank mines performed such a role and been so effective as in the defensive operation at Kursk. A well-conceived system of minefields linked with a system of antitank fire and maneuver had been created. German military specialists have observed that in the very first hours of the engagement the Wehrmacht sustained significant tank losses, particularly owing to mines. The minefields, deep wire entanglements, flank defenses and antitank obstacles made movement extraordinarily difficult and led to great holdups. Well-manned points of resistance deep in the operational zone, strong reserves and rigid defense of each meter of ground inflicted heavy losses on the attackers. Infantry was efficiently supported by the concentrated fire of the artillery formations and field rocket launchers. Special tank-destroyer artillery brigades of the 3-regiment Supreme Command reserve, whose formation began in April 1943 (it was armed with 60, and subsequently 72, 45(57)-mm and 76(100)-mm guns [12]), gave a good account of itself.

In a word, this was classical position defense, prepared, what is more, in good time and in accordance with all the rules of military-engineering art. The battle confirmed the full guarantee of its invincibility. The enemy was incapable of effecting a breakthrough deeper than the first army defensive line. In the zone of the Central Front the breakthrough stalled at a depth of 12 km, of the Voronezh Front, 35 km.

Bitter fighting developed between the Luftwaffe and Red Army Air Force. The latest Soviet La-5 FN fighters, which had such advantages over the Focke-Wulf-190 as a superiority in level speed of 40-50 km together with greater rate of climb, gave an excellent account of themselves in the struggle for domination the air. For the first time the Il-2 ground-attack fighters used special antitank hollow-charge bombs (weighing only 1.5-2.5 kg), which went right through the army of the Tigers and Panzers. Soviet air attacks made a substantial contribution to the wiping out of the Wehrmacht's armored groupings.

The biggest armored meeting engagement in history (on the south face of the Kursk arc, near Prokhorovka), in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides took part, took place on 12 July 1943. An appreciable part was played by the commitment to the engagement of the 5th Guards Tank Army commanded by Gen P.A. Rotmistrov, which in conjunction with the 5th Guards Army of A.S. Zhadov finally halted the enemy grouping of roughly equal strength (the 4th Tank Army Corps), whose morale had been broken in preceding fighting.

The Soviet troops defending at the Kursk bulge displayed mass heroism, steadfastness and high skill. The understanding by the men and the commanders of the wisdom of the command's plan and the training of the

personnel for premeditated defense at well prepared lines with a thoroughly conceived system of engineering support were factors of considerable importance here.

A great deal has changed since the time of the battle of Kursk. Weapons are different. But the dialectical interconnection between means of attack and defense and an offensive and defenses has remained and should still, evidently, attract the attention of people engaged in a study of problems of war and peace and a search for ways to achieve agreements on a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms and a strengthening of strategic stability.

History provides us with no ready prescriptions in this respect, but it can teach us a good deal and be a source of inspiration for new quest and reflection.

There can be no direct analogies between the battle of Kursk and nonprovocative defense on both sides of the line separating today the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Defenses at that time were created in the course of a war and had entirely different motives from a nonoffensive structure of armed forces and their strategy based on a mutual understanding in peacetime and susceptible to various measures of verification, including on-site inspection. However, the battle of Kursk dispels the doubts as to whether a thoroughly prepared position defense is capable of holding out in the face of the powerful onslaught of offensive means effective under other conditions.

Despite the fact that WWII as a whole was fought under the sign of the superiority of means of offense to means of defense, the battle of Kursk was convincing testimony to the possibility of skillful resistance to an offensive on condition of the availability of diverse and sufficient forces and resources of antitank defense, its sound organization and timely conscious renunciation of an offensive.

As at the end of WWI the fire of heavy machineguns led to the triumph of positional forms of troop formation and the ossification of the fronts, so antitank weapons in the middle of WWII limited the potential of mobility and the breaching of defenses by tanks.

This trend has made itself felt from time to time in the postwar years also. The development of offensive weapons has on each occasion come up against the counteraction of defensive weapons. This, specifically, was characteristic of the start of the 1970's, when means of combating aircraft (anti-aircraft guided missiles) and tanks (antitank guided missiles) proved highly efficient, and numerous voices began to be heard speaking about the decline of tactical aviation and tanks. And, indeed, in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war over 50 percent of the losses of aircraft and up to 70 percent of tanks were the result of the use of anti-aircraft and antitank guided missiles.

In the last war the development of armor-piercing composite shot and mines decided the outcome of the competition between mobile armor and antitank weapons in favor of the latter. The same may occur with conventional means of offense and defense in ground theaters under current conditions. Such thoughts are induced by the upgrading of antitank weapons, specifically, the prospects of the remote mining of the approaches to defenses with the aid of aircraft and missiles. With regard for these trends in the development of equipment a number of prominent political and military figures, scientists and the public in the West has in recent years been putting forward a variety of concepts of "nonprovocative defense". From the viewpoint of ensuring mutual security and enhancing the stability of the military-strategic balance this is, as A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, observed, "a search in a prudent direction" (13).

In the course of implementation of the significant reductions in armed forces and conventional arms proposed by the Warsaw Pact states conditions could be created whereby the possibilities of the defense of each side were obviously superior to those of the conduct of offensive operations. This would serve to strengthen strategic stability and graphically demonstrate the possibility of ensuring security without reliance on nuclear weapons.

Footnotes

1. See "Meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, Budapest, 10-11 June 1986," Moscow, 1986, pp 28-29.
2. PRAVDA, 30 May 1987.
3. Ibid.
4. KOMMUNIST No 3, 1985, p 62.
5. 80-100-mm front armor, 75-mm cannon and 75-100-mm front armor and 76-mm cannon respectively.
6. 15-52-mm for the T-34.
7. K. von Clausewitz, specifically, wrote as follows: "What is the point of defense? Holding. It is easier to hold than to acquire; it follows from this that defense, assuming identical weapons, is easier than offense. To what does the greater ease of holding compared to acquiring amount? To the fact that all the time which goes by unused is to the benefit of the defender. The latter will reap where he has not sown. Each omission of the attacker, whether as a consequence of a mistaken assessment, fear or sluggishness, is to the advantage of the defender." K. von Clausewitz, "On War," vol 2, Moscow, 1937, pp 6-7.

8. Victory in the battle of Kursk was secured to a considerable extent by the outstanding results of the work of military and political intelligence. It is important also that they were perceived correctly by the top command, primarily I.V. Stalin. This was appreciably different from his attitude toward the most serious intelligence on the eve of the war. As A.M. Vasilevskiy, chief of the General Staff at that time, wrote, our intelligence had managed to determine not only the overall intention of the enemy for the summer period of 1943, the direction of the assaults and the composition of the assault groupings and reserves but also in establishing the time of the start of the fascist offensive. See A.M. Vasilevskiy, "Life's Cause," Moscow, 1974, p 316.

9. See A.I. Bazhenov, "Ways To Enhance the Stability of Operational Defense" (VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 5, 1987, p 17).

10. M.A. Gareyev, "M.V. Frunze—Military Theorist," Moscow, 1985, pp 230, 231.

11. See A.A. Svechin, "Strategy," Moscow, 1927; A.A. Svechin, "History of Military Art," Moscow, 1922, pp 31, 46, 61-62; A.I. Verkhovskiy, "Fire. Maneuver. Concealment," Moscow, 1928.

12. Originally antitank artillery brigades of the Supreme Command reserve of 112 guns each had begun to be formed in April 1941. Since the start of the war these brigades had fought effectively against enemy tanks. However, owing to the shortage of armaments, they were disbanded. In their place 72 antitank artillery regiments (16-20 guns each) were formed in the summer and fall of 1941. See V. Budur, "Development of Antitank Artillery in the Great Patriotic War" (VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 6, 1973).

13. PRAVDA, 5 May 1987.

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XINHUA on Arms Race, Northern Europe
06131028 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
7 Oct 87 p 6

["Commentary" by RENMIN RIBAO reporter Gu Yaoming [7357 5069 6900]: "The Worries of Northern Europe"]

[Text] Stockholm, 4 Oct (RENMIN RIBAO)—In his recent speech in Murmansk, Gorbachev proposed that the Warsaw Pact and NATO should negotiate on reducing military activities in the waters of northern Europe to

relax tension in that region. His speech concerns precisely what the people in northern Europe are interested in and worried about. Therefore, it has very quickly evoked different repercussions.

Recently, a series of discussion meetings have been held by strategy and security specialists here on the strategic position of northern Europe. People heavily put forward this question: With the change of its strategic position, can the situation of northern Europe, which has all along been regarded as stable, be maintained?

The different but related diplomatic and defense policies pursued by the five northern European countries since World War II have led to the emergence of a so-called balance in northern Europe, a pattern of stability, in the region. As a matter of fact, northern Europe has become a buffer zone between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the intensified arms race at sea between the United States and the Soviet Union has made important changes in the strategic position of northern Europe, seriously threatening the "balance in northern Europe."

Since the 1970's, Soviet military strength has rapidly increased on the Kola Peninsula, which is adjacent to the border areas of Norway and Finland. Murmansk has become the biggest naval base in the world, and it has assembled 65 percent of the Soviet strategic nuclear submarines. According to reports, once a war breaks out, the task of the Northern Fleet there is to sail into the Atlantic to cut off the connection by sea between the United States and Western Europe.

In the face of this aggressive Soviet posture, the United States will not be outdone. It has set up two security lines to keep close watch on activities of the Soviet submarines, one from the northern tip of Norway to Bear Island in the Norway Sea and the other joining Greenland, Iceland, and Britain. It has also constantly increased its military strength at sea in this region. In the past 2 years, the United States has stepped up the "forward position defense strategy" in the northern waters of northern Europe. According to this strategic plan, once conflicts occur between the United States and the Soviet Union, U.S. submarines and aircraft carriers will quickly sail into the Barents Sea and the Baltic Sea to launch sudden attacks on the Soviet missile submarines in order to undermine the Soviet capacity of cutting the transportation line on sea between Europe and the United States.

On the one hand, the two superpowers have stepped up their arms race on sea in northern Europe and the North Pole, continuously expanded the scale of military exercises, and strengthened their submarine and aircraft reconnaissance activities. On the other hand, out of consideration for their respective interests, they are not ready to break the existing pattern in northern Europe. Therefore, northern Europe remains a stable region

politically, but militarily it is "fraught with tension and danger." The governments and people of the northern European countries cannot but feel worried about this.

Some security specialists held that the Soviet leader's proposal is mainly directed at the U.S. forward position defense strategy. Northern Europe's strategic position is more important to Soviet security than other regions. The increase in U.S. strength in this region constitutes a direct threat to Soviet security. That the Soviet Union has fostered confidence by reducing military activities in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Norway Sea, and Greenland is to a great extent to restrict U.S. strategic planning in this region.

What is worth noting is that in his speech Gorbachev accused NATO of starting to deploy sea-based and land-based cruise missiles in the north Atlantic to take the place of the land-based short- and medium-range missiles that will soon be eliminated. Therefore, the Soviet proposal can be regarded as an offensive in the arms control issue to maintain and strengthen the

momentum in relaxing tension in East-West relations after the United States and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement in principle on medium-range missiles.

Speaking recently about the situation in northern Europe, U.S. President Reagan explicitly said that the United States does not agree to the establishment of a nonnuclear zone in northern Europe. Gorbachev's proposal is undoubtedly directed at this U.S. position. It is meant to exert pressure on the United States so as to put it in a passive position and at the same time win the support of northern European states.

Reducing tension and unstable factors in northern Europe is the eager desire of the northern European states and their people. However, the strength that determines the situation in the region is not northern Europe itself but the two major military blocks. After the Soviet Union has put forward the new proposal, the world's public opinion will concern itself more about the development of the situation in northern Europe. The people here hope that the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, will take some positive and concrete measures to relax tension in this region.

Soviet Journal Praises Creation of South Atlantic NFZ

*18070002b Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA
in Russian No 8, Aug 87 pp 27-33*

[Article by O. A. Zhirnov and N. M. Isakova: "The South Atlantic Must Become a Zone of Peace"]

[Text] Brazil's initiative concerning the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZMS) is unquestionably a most important foreign policy action by the countries of Latin America, with significance which goes beyond the region's boundaries. It should be stated that the concept of establishing such a zone is not new. It originated essentially at the same time as the plans to establish the SATO [presumably: South Atlantic Treaty Organization] military bloc in the region and to counterbalance it. However, the concept of demilitarizing the South Atlantic began to acquire definite outlines only with the assumption of power by civilian governments in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.

After a number of bilateral meetings and an exchange of views, President Sarney gave advance notification at the 40th UN General Assembly Session in September 1985 of his intention to initiate the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. This intention was confirmed in May 1986 in a letter from Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Roberto Costa de Abreu Sodre to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. The message from the head of Itamaraty stated that Brazil will make every effort to ensure that the South Atlantic remains a region free from the arms race, nuclear weapons, and any kind of hostilities.

As a result of Brazilian diplomacy's persistent efforts, supported by the countries of Latin America and other states in the world community, including socialist states, the question of establishing a ZMS was included as a separate paragraph in the work agenda of the 41st UN General Assembly Session. A resolution proclaiming the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic was adopted on 27 October 1986. Adoption of the resolution presented for a vote by 11 developing countries, most of which are located in the South Atlantic basin¹, was supported by 124 states (including the socialist states); eight abstained², and only the United States voted against the resolution.

The resolution states in particular that "the General Assembly, taking into account the determination of the peoples of South Atlantic states to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to develop their relations under conditions of peace and freedom... and recognizing the particular interest of states in the region in extending regional cooperation for the purpose of economic development and safeguarding peace and their particular responsibility in this regard, solemnly declares the region of the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and South America a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic."³

The resolution expresses the conviction that creation of the ZMS "will make an important contribution to the effort to strengthen world peace and security and to promote the principles and objectives of the United Nations." In this connection, the United Nations called upon all countries of the world, and the great powers in particular, to strictly observe the status of the South Atlantic region as a zone of peace and cooperation, to put an end to their military presence, and not to station weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations considers putting an end to the apartheid system in the RSA and granting independence to Namibia to be mandatory conditions for safeguarding peace and security in the South Atlantic.

At the same time, the voting results also revealed differences among members of the international community in their approaches to the plan advanced by Brazil. The overwhelming majority of Latin American countries supported establishment of a ZMS in the South Atlantic. The positive position on this question is the consequence of noticeable changes in the foreign policy of many states in the region and their increased interest in disarmament matters and in searches for ways and means of maintaining regional and international security.

The attention being devoted by South American countries to the South Atlantic basin—a region which the aggressive circles of imperialism are counting on involving in the sphere of their military and strategic interests—is natural in the context of these changes. On one hand, the Malvinas crisis graphically demonstrated to states in the subregion the reality of the threat to their sovereignty and security; on the other hand, it demonstrated the urgent necessity of creating an international legal mechanism capable of protecting them from any intervention from outside and from encroachments on their sovereignty in the event that imperialism's strong points spring up here.⁴ Sodre declared this directly at the 41st UN General Assembly Session in presenting the Brazilian plan. Establishment of the ZMS, he said, pursues the objective of guaranteeing peace, security and development for a vast region of the globe which includes the countries of two continents, united by the common aspiration to surmount the obstacles to progress which arise on their path. Speaking of specific sources of a threat to the security of countries in the region, Sodre pointed to the crisis in South Africa and the situation which has taken shape with respect to the Malvinas (Falkland Islands). In his view, declaring the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation would be "a specific step" within the framework of that broad program which the international community considers of great importance "to turn irrational impulses toward confrontation into constructive activity in the area of peaceful international cooperation."⁵

An important element in the Brazilian plan is making the South Atlantic nuclear-free, which means eliminating all types of nuclear weapons here; at the same time, the

nuclear-free zone which would be established in this region could become an addition to the nuclear-free zone which exists in Latin America in conformity with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Responsibility and realism characterize Brazil's approach to the military and political situation which has taken shape in the South African subregion. "The Brazilian initiative," Itamaraty's declaration stressed, "does not aspire to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries."⁶ This was brought to light, for example, in evaluating the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, which cannot interfere with declaration of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation and is correctly considered an internal matter of this sovereign state, in the view of the representative of Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

One of the features of the plan to establish the ZMS is the concept of cooperation among coastal states, viewed as an important addition to steps of a military and political nature. In explaining its substance, Sodre stated in an interview with the Soviet weekly *ZA RUBEZHOM* that this concept involves different forms of cooperation: in the economic area (this includes expanding trade volume and technical cooperation), as well as the development of promising new fields in which the biogeographical similarity and mutually complementary aspects of the countries of West Africa and South America could be utilized to advantage.⁷

Argentina displayed great interest in adoption of the resolution. A number of remarks made by the Argentine representation touched on the problems stemming from Great Britain's military presence in the South Atlantic, not only from the stationing of a military base in the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), but because of its possession of several islands in this region as well—St Helena, Tristan da Cunha, Diego Alvarez (Gough Island) and Ascension, where the United States is leasing a military base. In particular, it was proposed that the wording "coastal states" in the Brazilian plan, which gives Great Britain and Chile the right to call themselves "coastal states" in the South Atlantic with all the consequences which follow from this, be replaced by the wording "the peoples of South America and Africa."⁸

Despite the fact that in the end the Malvinas problem was not mentioned in the Brazilian plan and their occupation by Great Britain was condemned only indirectly (in contrast to the occupation of Namibia, for example), President R. Alfonsín expressed support for the "philosophy" of the Brazilian proposal in June 1986. Later, speaking at the Eighth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries in Harare, he stated that declaring the South Atlantic a zone of peace and demilitarizing it, which presupposes that the arms race in this region is halted and it is made nuclear-free, is fully in accord with the policy of peace and disarmament being conducted steadfastly by his government.

Uruguay expressed unconditional support for the Brazilian initiative. On the eve of the 41st UN General Assembly Session, President Julio María Sanguinetti stated that his government not only will support the proposal by J. Sarney, but will also make "decisive efforts" to ensure that it is put into effect. Uruguay's representative to the United Nations stressed that the zone of peace and cooperation is particularly important juridically and politically, inasmuch as it represents a specific action for strengthening peace and developing cooperation in a vast region of the globe.

Brazil's initiative also was supported by the majority of African countries, with whom it has organized active and long-term cooperation. Practically all the states on the Atlantic coast of this region became coauthors of the draft resolution presented for the vote.

The position of a number of countries in the West was ambiguous. Thus France, which spoke in support of the initiative in the preliminary stage of its drafting, referred in the course of the session to the fact that the status of the zone may complicate the problem of freedom of navigation in the South Atlantic.

As already noted, the only country voting against the ZMS was the United States. In justifying its position, the American representative stated that the zone is being established because of a decision "from above," and not as the result of discussions among the states in the region. In his view, the text of the resolution also may limit the freedom of navigation and transit recognized by international law. The absence in the draft resolution of a precise definition of the water areas in the part of the zone between Africa and South America also drew an objection from the United States.⁹ The argument cited influenced the position of Spain and Algeria, which approved the plan with reservations as a result. However, the references to these arguments were used only as a formal pretext for rejecting the Brazilian plan.

The real reason for the rejection is concealed in the fundamentally negative position of the Reagan administration with respect to all initiatives involving the establishment of zones of peace. This is indicated by Washington's blocking of international efforts directed at demilitarizing the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and other regions in the world. Such an attitude naturally stems from American imperialism's hegemonist claims. Thus, the report by President R. Reagan "On U. S. Strategy in the Area of National Security" (January 1987) states that the United States will continue in the future "to maintain large land, naval and air forces during peacetime in Europe and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as other forces in the Western Hemisphere and the Indian Ocean."¹⁰

Military and strategic considerations also determined Great Britain's position. It formally spoke in support of the resolution. However, London's true attitude was demonstrated as early as the following day after its

adoption in the United Nations, when a unilateral decision was made to establish a 200-mile "exclusive economic zone" and a 150-mile fishing zone around the Malvinas (Falkland Islands). This decision by the Tory government, combined with its refusal to hold talks with Argentina on decolonization of the archipelago and expansion of its military presence in this region, was considered by the international community as an attempt to torpedo the UN decision.

The governments of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay gave a particularly sharp response to Britain's actions. They announced from the Brazilian capital that Great Britain's position nullifies the efforts to establish the ZMS in the South Atlantic. The Uruguayan Government stressed in a special communique that "any unilateral action can only contribute to the creation of dangerous tension in the region."¹¹

There are also Latin American opponents to the establishment of a ZMS in the South Atlantic. Thus, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador, as well as St Vincent and the Grenadines and St Christopher and Nevis, practically came out against the Brazilian proposal by refusing to take part in the voting in the United Nations. In addition, there is also opposition to the plans to establish the zone from the military circles of certain countries in the region. In particular, Chilean Admiral Jose Toribio Merino, the air force commander and member of the military junta, characterized the UN decision to declare the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation as "very wrong," considering the fact, he said, that about 60 percent of the oil needed by the West is shipped around Cape Horn and south of the Cape of Good Hope. Naturally, he sees a threat to these shipments from "the Russians."¹² Such views are also heard at times from some of the Brazilian military, which, judging by a report from the newspaper CLARIN, do not rule out the possibility that a regional organization will be created to defend the South Atlantic.¹³

The Soviet Union and other states in the socialist community expressed active support for the Brazilian initiative. The Soviet position with respect to zones of peace is an integral part of the overall foreign policy of the CPSU. The New Edition of the Party Program expresses the conviction that "Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins can and should become zones of peace and good-neighborliness."¹⁴ (It is appropriate to recall in this regard that it was precisely the Soviet Union that first advanced the concept of creating nuclear-free zones in 1956.) For this reason, the proposal to establish a ZMS in the South Atlantic met with a ready response in our country. Thus, A. A. Gromyko, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, stated at a dinner in honor of President R. Alfonsin: "The Soviet Union is doing everything possible to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation among states in all regions of the world and all the continents. The initiative by certain Latin American countries, including

Argentina, to turn the South Atlantic into a zone of peace and cooperation, free of nuclear weapons, essentially has something in common with this concept as well."¹⁵

The UN decision to declare the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation is an important international event. It was convincing testimony that new political thinking, which is in accord with the realities of the nuclear and space age, is paving the way more and more broadly in the international arena and in Latin America in particular, improving the chances of peace-loving forces in the struggle for mankind's survival. Addressing young diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this very spirit on 13 May this year, Brazilian President Jose Sarney said that the Brazilian plan to turn the South Atlantic into a zone free of nuclear weapons is an important landmark in developing a system of broad cooperation among states.

Footnotes

1. Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, and Uruguay.
2. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, the FRG, France, and Japan.
3. Documents of the United Nations, A/Res/41/11, 6 November 1986, pp 1-2.
4. The Malvinas are now quite a powerful military base already, essentially at NATO's disposal. It is equipped with missile launchers, electronic spying equipment, and a large airfield capable of accommodating heavy combat and transport aircraft. A nuclear submarine, two destroyers, patrol vessels, supersonic Phantom fighters and helicopters are on continuous duty. There are 1,000 persons in the military garrison. If necessary, the British command can increase this number significantly by airlifting an assault force.
5. CLARIN, Buenos Aires, 23 September 1986.
6. Ibid., 30 August 1986.
7. ZA RUBEZHOM, No 49, 1986, p 14.
8. CLARIN, 30 August 1986.
9. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that the southern boundary of the zone should be the 60th parallel of south latitude established by the Antarctic Treaty, which consolidated the demilitarization and nuclear-free status (denuclearization) of the sixth continent. The northern boundary could be a line extending from Cape Orange (on Brazilian territory) to Cap Blanc on the African coast.

10. Quoted from SShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1987, p 11.

11. CLARIN, 1 November 1986.

12. Ibid., 20 October 1986.

13. Ibid., 29 October 1986.

14. Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New Edition), Moscow, 1986, p 69.

15. PRAVDA, 14 October 1986.

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8936

Japanese Government to Probe U.S. Navy Nuclear Document

52600140 Tokyo KYODO in English 0838 GMT
24 Aug 87

[Text] Tokyo, 24 Aug KYODO—Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari said Monday that the Foreign Ministry will conduct a probe into a U.S. Navy declassified document which allegedly instructed commanders of U.S. Pacific Forces to coordinate the plans of Pacific nations to control nuclear accidents or incidents in the region.

The comment was made at a Security Affairs Special Committee meeting of the House of Representatives in response to questions by Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Diet member Tetsu Ueda.

Ueda cited a new report that the document suggested the United States is considering the introduction or transit of nuclear weapons in Japan in the event of an emergency despite Japan's non-nuclear policy.

According to the document, military commanders in the region were ordered "to recover or remove, if at all practicable, all evidence of the nuclear weapons accident or significant incident as expeditiously as possible."

The document, dated May 8, 1984, was obtained recently by Nautilus, a private U.S. research organization, KYODO News Service reported from Washington.

Regarding the existence of explosives disposal (EOD) detachments under U.S. Navy command in the region, Hiroaki Fujii, director general of the Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau, admitted that the U.S. forces in Japan deploy such detachments.

Fujii added, however, that the military unit deals with ordinary explosives disposal, and does not specialize in the control of nuclear accidents.

He also denied a news report concerning the document which suggested that the Japanese Government has been contacted by U.S. diplomatic missions here to confer on the control of nuclear accidents and the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan.

The document, issued in the name of the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Force, said that a total of 16 detachments stationed worldwide included the two deployed at the U.S. Navy bases at Yokosuka and Sasebo.

/9738

USSR: 'Question of Confidence' in U.S. Moves
PM030935 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Oct 87 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Soldatenko article: "Strengthening, Not Destroying Confidence"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, raised the question of confidence between the USSR and the United States in his 23 October Kremlin talks with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. The Soviet leadership seeks to utilize every opportunity to broaden mutual understanding between the two countries' citizens, encourages various forms of public contacts at all levels, and takes other specific practical measures to strengthen confidence. The possibility of U.S. scientists' setting up their apparatus to verify the staging of nuclear tests at the Soviet site in Kazakhstan, the visit of a group of U.S. Congress representatives to the radar station under construction in Siberia for tracking objects in space, the invitation to experts, diplomats, and journalists from 44 countries to visit the chemical installation in Saratov Oblast—all this convincingly demonstrates the USSR's honest and open approach to resolving complex international problems.

But there are circles in the West which oppose the creation of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world and seek to frustrate or, at least, to do all they can to hamper the reaching of any disarmament agreement. They have plenty of experience in this regard. In the history of Soviet-U.S. relations there are many examples where the Soviet Union's peace-loving steps have, quite frankly, been greeted across the ocean with actions aimed at exacerbating the international situation and escalating the arms race. Here are just a few examples confirming this.

In February 1981 the USSR announced that it would not produce neutron weapons unless other states acquired them, and it expressed its readiness to conclude an international agreement banning those weapons forever. But what was the U.S. response? On 6 August 1981 it issued an order to start large-scale production of neutron weapons.

Washington ostentatiously refused to subscribe to the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions. During the 18 months that our moratorium was in effect the United States conducted 26 nuclear weapon tests. The U.S. adoption of a decision to assemble binary chemical ammunition was its response to the showing of the Shikhany chemical installation to U.S. and other foreign experts. Nor did the U.S. side consent to M.S. Gorbachev's proposal to proclaim a moratorium, effective 1 November, on all work connected with the production, testing, and deployment of medium- and short-range missiles.

I could continue the list of such "responses." We do not encounter U.S. reciprocity in the matter of strengthening confidence-building measures. On the contrary, Washington, despite officially made public declarations and assurances, is continuing to pursue a policy of fanning mistrust and suspicion and is cultivating a "hostile image" with regard to the Soviet Union. There was the unworthy propaganda ballyhoo over the case of the U.S. journalist Daniloff in 1986, that is, on the eve of the Reykjavik summit meeting, and the espionage passions over the U.S. Embassy in Moscow shortly before Secretary of State G. Shultz visited the USSR. A recent piece of evidence is the document "Activity in Ensuring Soviet Influence: Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-1987," compiled by the State Department jointly with a number of other U.S. departments.

The U.S. side is also pursuing the same policy of undermining Soviet-U.S. confidence in the military sphere. What is the significance, for example, of the test of the new 12-warhead D-5 missile for the Trident-2 nuclear-powered submarines, which was conducted soon after E.A. Shevardnadze's Washington meeting with R. Reagan and G. Shultz? L. Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, voiced the quite valid fear that such a test will complicate the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms and make it more difficult to agree on measures to verify the number of warheads on U.S. SLBM's.

On 17 September, literally the final day of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Washington at which an accord was reached in principle on the "global double-zero," the Pentagon leader adopted a decision to conduct demonstration tests of six technological developments [razrabotki] which could be used when deploying the first echelon of an ABM system with space-based elements. Even the U.S. press admitted that such an action undermines the ABM Treaty, without which, as is known, no agreement on reducing strategic offensive arms is possible.

How are we to evaluate such provocative actions as, for example, the repeated incursions by U.S. warships into USSR territorial waters, which are carried out, so *The New York Times* believes, not without grounds, within the framework of a large-scale espionage operation against the USSR on the Pentagon's orders? According to the newspaper's information, numerous eavesdropping devices and other electronic apparatus for gathering data on the Soviet Armed Forces had been set up on board the cruiser *Yorktown* and the destroyer *Caron*, which penetrated Soviet territorial waters 13 March 1986 in the Black Sea off the south Crimean coast. The U.S. nuclear-powered missile cruiser *Arkansas* violated the USSR state border in the region of the Avachinskiy Gulf 17 and 21 May 1987.

There has recently been an increase also in the number of violations of the airspace of the USSR and its allies. On 22 September 1987 a U.S. helicopter violated the GDR state border northwest of the city of Erfurt. There has

been a sharp increase in the launch of "reconnaissance balloons" packed with all kinds of apparatus over USSR territory. On 4 October 1987 eight such unmanned means of espionage at once were sent from the Baltic in the direction of our country's state border. The number of U.S. and NATO reconnaissance aircraft which come almost right up to USSR airspace during military exercises is also growing continuously. There have been almost 5,500 such extremely dangerous incidents so far this year.

One wonders what kind of confidence there can be in such a situation. But it is evidently precisely such a situation that best suits the opponents of easing tension, who argue like this: If there is no confidence, there can be no implementation of an accord on reducing nuclear weapons.

But this is yesterday's thinking: We must not play at politics in the nuclear age. It is always possible and necessary to find ways to strengthen confidence among peoples if the political will for this exists. This is confirmed by the adoption of the substantive and far-reaching document on strengthening confidence- and security-building measures at the Stockholm conference in 1986. Through joint efforts all the European participant states, as well as the United States and Canada, were able to overcome their disagreements and reach accords on a number of key questions of ensuring security in Europe, concretize the principle of the nonuse of force, make it effective, and find mutually acceptable measures to strengthen confidence and security in the military sphere.

The victory of common sense in Stockholm was a great step toward easing tension and improving the international political climate so necessary for resolving the vital problems of our nuclear age. The participant states' exchange of their plans for notifiable military activity for the next year before 15 November and the reaching of an accord on inspections on demand, of which the United States and the USSR have already availed themselves, are of particularly great significance from the military and political viewpoints. They not only give all states an overall picture of military activity in the very near future but also show their readiness to remove suspicion in relations with each other and to direct their thinking away from confrontation and toward confidence.

The USSR sets a convincing example here. The names of three population centers on USSR territory—Semipalatinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Shikhany—are perceived everywhere as synonyms for the concepts of "goodwill" and "new political thinking." Following the U.S. congressmen's familiarization with the Krasnoyarsk radar, it is logical to expect the U.S. Administration to grant Soviet representatives the right to a reciprocal visit to the U.S. radar at Thule (Greenland). Permission from official Washington for Soviet scientists to set up their apparatus to verify the holding of nuclear tests on the Nevada site would also help to remove mutual suspicions.

Confidence must be a two-way street. As M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in conversation with G. Shultz, it is necessary to clear the road toward each other with not only Soviet but also U.S. bulldozers. So it is time to abandon the desire to "get around" the other side for the sake of one's own narrow mercenary interests. Real security can only be equal and universal.

Soviet Journal On Demilitarizing World Economy
18160012e Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHIDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 87 (signed to press 17 Jul 87) pp 9-20

[Article by I. Ivanov: "Demilitarization of the World Economy—Urgent Necessity"]

[Text] The arms race is incompatible with the new political thinking, which is an imperative of the nuclear age. It is unacceptable not only as a means of securing the external interests or national security of this state or the other but also economically, owing to the tribute which militarism compels all mankind to pay. "To pay," as the 27th CPSU Congress pointed out, "directly and indirectly... by a waste of national resources and the diversion of gigantic sums into the arms race. And the unsolved state of numerous increasingly difficult problems." Whence the extensive international comment elicited by the Soviet "disarmament for development" concept advanced in the well-known statement of M.S. Gorbachev of 15 January 1986. It has already become a part of the political platform of the nonaligned movement and many mass antiwar movements.

A special UN conference on the interrelationship between disarmament and development is opening at this time in New York. It is assembling a year late owing to the obstructionist policy of the United States and a number of NATO countries. However, the obstacles which had been created were overcome by the efforts of the socialist and emergent states and the world community as a whole. Mankind no longer wishes to be reconciled to the fact that "hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the production and upgrading of weapons." UN experts stress, "are in grim and dramatic contrast to the need and poverty in which two-thirds of mankind lives" (1).

Truly, present-day militarism is acquiring many new danger and ugly features.

I

What is qualitatively new is primarily the fact that, given the present scale of military production, it is not only the survival of mankind which is being put in jeopardy. Even under conditions of peace the further progress of civilization is problematical since the burden of the arms race is becoming comparable to the material losses from world wars.

Thus approximately 50 million persons are involved in the sphere of military production activity in the world, UN experts estimate. It accounts for approximately one-fifth of the contingent of scientists and engineers. Annual military spending amounts to \$600 billion—an amount exceeding the total GNP of the developing countries of South Asia and the Pacific. As of the mid-1970's the increase in this spending has been overtaking economic growth. In sum, in the past 10 years the total thereof has exceeded total material losses from WWI. If existing trends in this sphere continue, the total burden of the arms race threatens by the year 2000 to have far surpassed mankind's material losses from WWII (2).

Further, the diversion of resources into the arms race has become so considerable that it is deforming the social production mechanism. Confiscating states' resources, military preparations are holding back an increase in economic potential and its modernization, which is particularly ruinous in a period of the radical structural changes occurring in the world economy.

According to the calculations of the American economists (R. Degress) and (D. Greysers), states with high military spending are investing relatively less and lagging behind in the increase in and modernization of fixed capital, productivity and competitiveness. Their economic growth, to which the military product is mechanically ascribed, is "inflated," and the expanded nature of production is largely illusory (3).

Primarily these negative phenomena are leading to the disorder of state finances. The price of the military product usually grows more rapidly than that of the civil product. Military spending is being covered partly thanks to deficit financing and loans on the money market. As a result budgets are becoming unbalanced. Bank interest rate is rising and national and private debt is increasing.

The arms race also has clearly expressed negative social consequences. Arms production is less labor-intensive than civil production, and it is social needs primarily which are sacrificed to the military budgets. A study conducted by West German specialists showed that of the five leading capitalist countries the highest level of unemployment was observed where the biggest military spending was noted. As far as social programs are concerned, "each manufactured gun, each warship launched," former U.S. President D. Eisenhower observed, "and each rocket launched ultimately means theft from those who are starving and undernourished and who are suffering from cold and lack clothing" (4).

Finally, the arms race is also militarizing international economic relations, which are now influencing economic growth so appreciably. Up to one-tenth of the consumption of individual raw material commodities goes for military needs. As a result artificial "strategic stockpiles" thereof disorganizing the raw material markets are being

built up. All kinds of "prohibited lists" are coming into use on the finished product markets and in the technical assistance field. Weapons themselves, the constant increase in the costs of the production of which requires to ensure profitability increasingly large series production and, consequently, exports, are among the most important commodities of international trade. Such exports, in turn, are inciting discord and hostility between the countries importing the weapons and leading to an intensification of regional conflicts.

The large-scale and far-reaching consequences of militarism damage a national economy of any level of development and size. Nor is the United States, whose economic position is highly indicative in this respect, any exception. Burdened with incredible military spending, this country loses every 12-14 years resources the equivalent of its annual GNP. In terms of competitiveness and increase in productivity it has sunk almost to the end of the list of the 17 main capitalist states. The huge foreign payments deficit and the federal budget deficit have already led to a fall in the exchange rate of the dollar and a swelling of the national debt, which may be considered a kind of synthesized expression of the price of the arms race for the American economy. The United States' foreign debt alone increased from 2 percent of GNP in 1985 to 8 percent in 1987, and by 1991 threatens to have risen to 17 percent of the gross product. National assets totaling approximately \$1.2 billion and also 12.4 million acres of land have already passed into the hands of foreigners. As a whole, counterposed to actual money in circulation and the country's gold and currency reserves totaling \$330 billion is a \$10 trillion internal and foreign debt. According to the American economists M. Carnoy, D. Shearer and R. Rumburger, under these conditions the United States cannot simultaneously both conduct an arms race and undertake the dynamic structural modernization of the economy. The authoritative banker E. Kirkland, on the other hand, believes that the country is already heading downhill within the framework of the "long-wave cycle" of economic activity (the "Kondratieff cycle") pertaining to the latter half of the 20th century (5).

It is not fortuitous that there are multiplying appeals for the ruinous "security through armament" hypnosis to be shaken off. "The growing economic outlays on the production of modern arms systems," a report of the European Trade Union Movement Institute pointed out, "are completely unjustified from the political viewpoint since they by no means enhance the level of a nation's security." In the United States only 31 percent of Americans polled in the spring of 1987 urged an increase in military spending (including only 23 percent in favor of "star wars"), whereas 71 percent demanded increased appropriations for aid to the poor and the homeless, and 78 percent, for social needs (6).

Yet according to estimates of IMEMO specialists, the United States' adoption of the proposals contained in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement alone

would enable it to save approximately \$1 trillion on military spending. This would mean a sharp reduction in budget deficits, a curbing of inflation, stimulation of the modernization of industry, a galvanization of social policy and so forth. And such savings could ultimately become a reality if the Soviet-American arms reduction negotiations finally produce a concrete result.

Nonetheless, the advocates of militarization are not going away, advancing in its defense updated arguments against disarmament and, consequently, against development. The most importunate sound is coming from the chorus of rightwing figures in a number of West European countries, who believe that a renunciation of nuclear weapons will either render it "defenseless" or require by way of compensation a buildup of conventional arms, a race in which per unit of power of destruction is more costly than in nuclear arms. However, quite apart from the risk connected with the deployment of nuclear weapons in such a densely populated region of the world, such calls could, if realized, deprive West Europeans precisely of the resources which they are now attempting to find to do away with the technical and economic lag behind the United States and Japan.

The military technocrats are presenting their calculations also. They are attempting to prove that a dismantling of weapons systems could prove more costly than their creation. Yet the elimination of one nuclear submarine would cost, for example, \$24 million, and of a bomber, \$14,500, but their operation alone costs \$60 million and \$7.3 million respectively.

Ultimately the main argument is that according to which the arms race needs to be continued in order to "economically exhaust" the Soviet Union, thereby achieving victory in the competition of the two social systems.

It is well known that the Soviet Union does not aspire to military superiority and sees the way to ensuring security in a reduction in the level of military-strategic balance. At the same time, however, under existing conditions our defense does not come cheaply. The budget for 1987 allocated for these purposes R20.2 billion compared with R19 billion in 1986. This is twice as much as the expenditure on environmental protection or the development of light industry, is more than all appropriations for health care, physical culture and sport and constitutes two-thirds of the resources allocated for housing construction, transport and communications, two-fifths of budget and credit investments in the agrarian-industrial complex and approximately one-third of expenditure on social security. Finally, the said amount is roughly equal to the budgets of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldavia, Latvia, Kirghizia, Turkmenia, Tajikistan, Armenia and Estonia together.

There is no doubt that the defense burden is very telling for the socialist economy. Disarmament would help our development also. However, hopes of running the Soviet economy "into the ground" on this path are illusory.

They were not realized even in years which were not its best and are even more absurd in the approaching period of acceleration. In addition, the difficulties of the USSR, real ones, not invented ones, will by no means solve the problems of the United States itself and other NATO countries, where they are far more acute. "We often hear, from President Reagan included," the *International Herald Tribune* writes in this connection, "that only Mikhail Gorbachev needs an arms control agreement, and for economic reasons, what is more.... But the same could be said about the United States also. And should be said since the huge amounts which America is spending on weapons are the sole reason for its loss of its economic superiority to Japan and other countries. The spending on arms is a heavy burden on the country's capacity for competing in this world of growing rivalry.... The lesson is perfectly clear," the newspaper concludes, "America's statesmen, possessed by the idea of the Soviet threat, are causing the country severe economic harm. In its ardor to create ever newer and ever bigger weapons in ever larger quantities the United States is squandering intellectual resources so necessary for countering the real challenges of the present day" (7).

The "disarmament for development" concept is of tremendous significance for all groups of states. It incorporates not only a moral-political imperative but also intelligent demands of present-day economic and business life. This is manifested as graphically as can be in such questions troubling the world as the problems of the emergent countries and the prospects of S&T progress. The belief in the practicability of the conversion of military industry for satisfaction of civil needs is strengthening also.

II

Speaking of Asian, African and Latin American countries, P. Noel-Baker once emphasized that for them "disarmament and development are not two different problems but one. They must either be tackled together or neither will be solved" (8).

Indeed, in the atmosphere of intensifying arms race the amount of the resources being transferred to the "third world" in the form of aid is diminishing literally before our eyes. For the OECD countries "official development assistance" now constitutes 0.34 percent of their GNP or half as much as recommended by the United Nations, and the United States is in last place (0.2 percent) in this respect (9). Simultaneously the loans to which governments of the Western powers are resorting on the money markets to cover their deficits taking shape as a result of the buildup of military spending have led to a sharp surge in the interest on private credit to the developing countries, thereby making a substantial "contribution" to their trillion-dollar debt. Finally, the arms race itself in the NATO countries is being financed largely precisely thanks to exploitation of the developing states.

There is a multichannel mechanism of this financing. The basis thereof are the neocolonial profits of the transnational corporations, which are subsequently either transferred directly to their subdivisions engaged in military business or are taken via taxes into the budgets of the NATO countries, military included. The latter are also replenished thanks to the imperialist powers' income from their credit transactions in the "third world". All this is crowned by government borrowing on private money markets, on which also part of the neocolonial profits of the TNC transnational banks which they put into financial circulation ends up. A quantitative evaluation of this transfer is difficult owing to a lack of statistical data. However, it is evidently a question here of many billions, about which the press of the developing states writes. "The imperialist powers," the Indian NATIONAL HERALD observes, "are transferring on an ever increasing scale in every possible way the material resources of the developing countries to their economy.... While experiencing the negative impact of militarism, they themselves are being forced to finance it, despite the fact that the gap between them and the industrial countries is increasing continually."

The arms race is also attended for the developing economy by indirect negative consequences. Military production is less materials-intensive than civil production. Even in a tank traditional construction materials "extend" to only 60-65 percent of its cost, whereas in a tractor, 75 percent. The corresponding indicator for warships is 60 percent. In military electronics 40 kg of optical fiber replaces a ton of copper. All this is causing a relative diminution in the need for the raw material exported by the developing countries and lowering the price thereof. Simultaneously unemployment born of the same militarization is reducing demand for consumer goods from the "third world".

It is clear that disarmament could at a stroke cut the knot of all these interconnected problems. But the bacilli of militarism are as yet penetrating the economy of the developing countries themselves, pulling them into the arms race. These countries' military spending has increased in the past 15 years in the proportion of 0.9 per 1 percent of economic growth, and the "third world's" share of world military spending is now higher even than that of the world GNP.

Of course, a distinction needs to be made in connection with the direction of this expenditure—into the defense of national independence against the intrigues of imperialism and its agents or the suppression of its own peoples and provocations against neighbors. But in any event this is placing on the fragile economy of the emergent states the heaviest burden, swallowing up up to one-third of the accumulation fund and forming a 20-percent increase approximately in the foreign debt. Up to three-fourths of world arms exports is channeled into the developing countries, although, according to the calculations of UN economists, each dollar spent to this

end reduces their domestic capital investments by 25 cents, and given arms imports of the order of 6-8 percent of GNP, the development process is coming to a halt altogether (10).

The damage from militarization is augmented in the "third world" by direct losses from military conflicts largely growing in its soil. More people have perished from them in Africa than in the course of the struggle for independence. Huge and senseless losses are being inflicted on one another, for example, by Iran and Iraq. The countries which make their territory available as springboards for aggression against neighbors are being harmed also. In the southern areas of Honduras, where the "contras" have made their nest, 200,000 peasants have been driven from the land, the owners of coffee plantations have lost \$15 million and employment has declined. Regional conflicts are being artificially fanned by imperialism and the arms manufacturers, and it is not surprising that the reduction in the emergent states' military spending in the last 3 years has caused a real panic in West Europe's military-industrial circles (11).

As a whole, however, "we do not have to fire a missile from a Trident submarine and then count the dead," G. Galloway, general secretary of the British War on Want organization, observed. "Millions of people dying every year from starvation and diseases connected therewith may also be considered partially casualties of the nuclear arms race.... The first casualties are the poor. They are dying either from the fire of the tanks or because their government prefers to buy tanks and not food." "There is a clear connection," he sums up, "between the problem of hunger in the world and the economic underdevelopment of many countries on the one hand and the fabulous expenditure of resources on arms on the other."

And, on the other hand, disarmament and use of some of the resources thus saved for development purposes would afford the developing countries entirely different prospects. "Per capita consumption per dollar of reduction in military spending," the American economists W. Leontieff and F. Duchin point out, "would grow particularly rapidly in the poorest developing countries located in the arid zone of Africa, Tropical Africa and the resource-poor zone of Latin America" (12).

A reduction in military spending would normalize world raw material trade and the situation on credit markets. Additional resources would appear for "official development assistance" and solution of the debt problem. In any event, it may be said with confidence that the present net outflow of resources from the "third world" would be replaced by an influx thereof. It would be possible to a large extent to avoid relapses into power politics in foreign economic relations. "Disarmament," UN experts note, "would in the long term contribute to the efficient economic and social development of all countries, developing countries particularly, facilitating a closing of the economic gap between them and the

establishment of a new international economic order based on justice, equality and cooperation in the solution of other global problems" (13).

A reduction in the developing countries in the local burden of military spending would have an appreciable effect also. According to UN experts, given a reduction in the proportion of this spending in GNP from 4.5 to 3.5 percent, savings could increase by 2.7 percentage points, and economic growth, by 0.3 percent, and there would be a sharp diminution in the need to attract loan capital from abroad. In turn, a renunciation of arms imports would lead to an increase in the economic growth rate of 0.76 percent and a reduction in the sum total of foreign debt by 20-30 percent and in the proportion of the payment of interest in all debt payments, to 26 percent, and a surplus instead of a deficit trade balance. "While the price of militarization could prove intolerable," the British economist S. (Dedzher) concludes this econometric analysis, "disarmament offers an economical and productive alternative for development" (14).

It is not fortuitous that the idea of the organic interconnection of disarmament and development permeates all recent documents of the nonaligned movement. "The heads of state and government emphasize the direct connection between peace, disarmament and development," the economic declaration of the Eighth Non-aligned Conference in Harare points out. "They note that orderly development may be achieved only in an atmosphere of peace and cooperation and in this connection confirm their appeal for an immediate halt to the arms race, which should be followed by urgent disarmament steps in order to release in this sphere the human, financial, material and technological resources so necessary for development" (15).

Here the positions of the nonaligned and socialist countries are close or coincide.

III

In our time it is of fundamental importance to correctly determine the interconnection which exists between such phenomena as militarism and S&T progress. One aspect of this interconnection is obvious and tragic—the achievements of science are being remelted into weapons of mass annihilation. Militarism is using them for a qualitative upgrading of arms and to circumvent and undermine accords on control thereof. "It would be an unforgivable mistake to abandon the use of new technology for defense needs," French Premier L. Fabius once maintained. "Our main task and the task of our allies is to ensure that this technology provide us with a 'deterrence factor,' which is essential for maintaining the stability of international relations" (16). Irresponsible, illusory hopes of winning an arms race and ensuring security through "fear of retribution" are thereby linked

with the progress of technology. Such hopes merely make more difficult, if not actually block, the sole dependable guarantee of international security by political means.

But a whole school has taken shape in the West unequivocally proclaiming the militarization of science an essential prerequisite of its development in general. Thus E. Martin, undersecretary of defense of the United States for research and development, believes that "scientific research for defense needs is extending the horizons of science and technology." Even if "these benefits are far off," its American political scientist B. Steinberg emphasizes, "they could still be tremendous" (17). West German Chancellor H. Kohl believes that the country which does not conduct military research "will become a second-rate state". Reference is made here to the transfer of technology from military to civil sectors and the creation in military laboratories of substantial amounts of "dual-purpose" technology.

Of course, it cannot be denied that a number of technical innovations which have now become widespread originally appeared in the military research sphere. However, this is only a secondary result of the process of the intensive squandering of accumulated S&T potential for unproductive and inhumane purposes.

According to the estimates of UN experts, the civil sectors of the economy, providing for 95 percent of the world GNP, dispose of only 75 percent of the world science potential, which is in itself a disproportion. Militarization means the secrecy of the results of R&D and restrictions on their dissemination. The main intrinsic regularity of the development of science as a universal process fed by the mutual exchange of information is thereby disrupted. Military-engineering designs, on the other hand, which may be offered for transfer to the civil sectors, have at least three negative features.

First, they are designed for a limited circle of sectors. In the United States this means approximately 60 of the 496 subsectors, which, naturally, is very far from technical support of the entire economy. Second, military R&D is in its latest fields frequently very far removed from civil needs. As UN experts estimate, barely 20 percent of such development is directly applicable for nonmilitary purposes. Finally, like the entire military product, such designs are developed utterly without regard for costs, which makes their assimilation in civil industry unprofitable. It was not fortuitous that London's *The Economist* noted "the growing incapacity of U.S. industry to make things which are attractive to Americans, let alone foreigners," and for this reason the arms race is now a most important factor of the deterioration in the competitive positions of the United States on world markets (18).

In addition, in accelerating the arms race the alliance of military clients and contractors is at every step permitting the production of military products in a technically

unfinished form, and this is merely increasing recklessness in military-engineering policy and the risk of an accidental outbreak of a conflict. For example, the B-1B bomber is being manufactured with work still to be done on its "electronic brain," in the equipment for "blinding" an enemy's radar installations and in the cruise-missile firing mechanisms included; the stress on its wing area is close to being destructive and so forth. The catastrophe of the American Challenger shuttle spacecraft was, as it turned out, essentially programmed inasmuch as at the time it was being built the Thiokol company allowed engineering mistakes to occur. As the newspaper *People's World* observed, the U.S. Navy spent \$65 million on a new communications system without having given clear technical justification, and the Air Force allocated \$6 billion for a new tactical fighter without the corresponding cost and laboratory analysis.

What is new under these conditions is no longer the transfer of technology from the military to the civil sectors but, on the contrary, a persistent search for ideas by militarized science in civil science. This largely explains the United States' endeavor to involve the S&T potential of its allies, specifically Japan, in the SDI. The Challenger catastrophe has prompted NASA to direct its sights toward the near-Earth orbital station planned by the European Space Agency for peaceful purposes, but promising, the Americans believe, for work pertaining to the "star wars" program.

In sum, by virtue of its scale, the militarization of science in the West also is beginning to acquire qualitatively new features. Having reached certain limits, it is weakening and severing the connection between the pace and level of the development of science and the dynamics of social labor productivity. "Science and technology," K. Marx once noted, "communicate to functioning capital a capacity for expansion independent of its given value" (19). This rule, however, is hardly now applicable to the functioning of the aggregate capital of the most militarized NATO countries. For example, the United States, which is absolutely and relatively superior to the other capitalist countries in terms of the number of scientists and amount of expenditure on R&D, occupies among them, as mentioned above, a highly unenviable place in terms of labor productivity growth rate, is living in debt to a large extent and has a deficit trade balance in science-intensive civil products.

Militarized science does practically nothing for the development of the emergent countries either. On the contrary, it increasingly consolidates their peripheral status and creates new threads of military-technical dependence. The "star wars" program demonstrates all this as clearly as could be. According to the estimates of its "spiritual father," E. Teller, which are sustained in a spirit of publicity, up to 90 percent of the results of the program may subsequently be used for civil purposes. "Much of the technology which will be studied within the framework of the SDI research program," G. Pattie, former minister of trade and industry of Great Britain,

supported it, "is that on which the future of industrial civilization depends... and future generations will not thank us if we turn our back on these opportunities."

But it is precisely the work within the "strategic defense initiative" framework which is shrouded in a curtain of particular secrecy. The transfer of its results even to the overseas firms which are acting the part of subcontractors is authorized only "within the limits permitted by the interests of the security of the United States".

The civil returns from realization of this program, L. Branscomb, vice president of IBM, estimates, "will amount more to a drop in the ocean" for superpowerful lasers, particle beams, large-scale optics and infrared sensors will hardly find a commercial application. Finally, the American Society of Physicists estimates, the SDI is altogether reckless since the parameters of technology required for its realization exceed the current possibilities of science by many orders of magnitude (20).

In sum the "strategic defense initiative," by tying up scientific and technical resources, the American expert M. Lucas collates the possible effect of this program, "will probably impede the introduction... of civil technology necessary for an upturn of the Western economy. The 'star wars' program will also place the machinery of the security services above scientific activity as a whole. This will slow down even more the introduction of innovations and the spread of new technology to various nonmilitary sectors of the economy inasmuch as scientific developments produce the best results not under conditions of secrecy but, the reverse, given an unimpeded exchange of opinions. Creative research will in many instances probably be held back. Important discoveries which could be applied in the civil sphere will be classified. And export restrictions dictated by security considerations will be extended to many of the innovations which will, for all that, come onto the market. Ultimately this will lead to a delay in the expansion of mass markets for the sale of new products and also in the application of new technology for the solution of large-scale economic problems." Indeed, the United States' civil product is now, according to some estimates, 20 times less science-intensive than the military product (21).

For this reason questions of the release of science and technology from the "militarist ghetto" into which they are being driven by the military-industrial complex merit detailed discussion at the upcoming UN conference, and their solution requires practical action on the part of all its participants.

IV

The "disarmament through development" concept is applicable by no means only in the redistribution and financial sphere. It could also extend to the sphere of production, in which it presupposes the conversion of military industry and its transfer to the manufacture of

civil products. In turn, conversion could most seriously undermine the economic and entrepreneurial motives of the arms race and halt it at its very sources.

The proponents of militarism are attempting to intimidate the public with the fact that conversion would cause chaos in the capitalist economy, including unemployment and the bankruptcy of many corporations. However, there is already sufficiently extensive literature refuting such assertions. Thus calculations show that employment would not fall at the time of conversion but, on the contrary, would increase, and only 1 percent approximately of the amount of military spending would go on restructuring and the retraining of the workforce, what is more. The complete replaceability at the macroeconomic level of government military spending by civil spending in the function of impact on the marketplace has been proven. This was checked out in the economic report of President L. Johnson for 1969, and in 1972 the R. Nixon administration actually reoriented part of the military budget toward social needs and the cities, science and education (22). In the practical plane questions of the conversion of military industry were posed in the platform of the British Labor Party in the period 1974-1977. Not only did none of this "ruin" the economy of the United States and Britain but even helped them in some respects overcome the energy crisis more quickly. Unfortunately, such impetus of the detente period was subsequently lost when it was dismantled by rightwing conservative circles.

Within the framework of this article a subject of special analysis is civil conversion in its least studied component—at the microeconomic level, within the framework of individual firms and enterprises. An analysis shows that here also it is not only feasible in principle but also attainable relatively quickly for it can be prepared on the basis of the extensive experience of the reorientation of production in the wake of changing demands of the market which the corporations already have.

Under the conditions of current structural changes and the extremely changeable marketplace questions of a transfer of resources and the reorientation of production have become the daily concern of executives of practically all corporations, which are resorting for this purpose to its diversification, the manufacture of new commodities or a search for new spheres of application of products already being manufactured.

In Japan, for example, there has been a pronounced reduction in recent years in the production of aluminum, synthetic fiber and ships, however, the firms which produced them have not gone bankrupt but have switched to new markets. This is also happening on an extensive scale in the United States, where industry, encountering increased import competition, also regularly adjusts its production profile. According to the estimates of UN experts, periods of such adaptation take from 3 months to 3 years, but it is significant that it is a question of actual facts of business practice.

Similar instances also arise at the junction of civil and military production, the boundaries between which from the viewpoint of intrafirm management are generally quite mobile. In the United States, for example, the proportion of military consumption of semiconductors has in its time fallen in 13 years from 38 to 21 percent, computer chips, in 6 years from 100 to 37 percent, and computers, in the same period from 100 to 47 percent. The instance of IBM in just one year reorienting 30 percent of the manufacture of its computers from military to civil demand is known (23).

This endeavor is further explained by the fact that military-industrial business is highly specific. Superprofits therein coexist with a rapid change in technical requirements, a bitter struggle for orders and underloaded capacity. Sharp, including annual, fluctuations in the proportion of military orders in overall turnover may be seen among many corporations, including the Pentagon's leading contractors.

In addition, there are examples of the special (and successful) conversion of military to civil production undertaken in a number of firms at the initiative of the unions or management. Particularly receptive to it here are diversified concerns with experience of the intrafirm maneuvering of capital and capacity. Thus the trade union at the Lucas Aerospace firm (Britain) ascertained approximately 150 alternative civil commodities which could be produced at its plants manufacturing military products. Some 54 types of such commodities were ascertained at the naval yards of the Vickers concern in Barrow. It was ascertained also that it was possible at the plant in Newcastle to produce instead of Chieftain tanks presses and equipment for coal mining, bulldozers, steam generators and pumps. Even the Royal Munitions Factory in London proved capable of manufacturing home electronics and radio equipment.

In the FRG the trade union at the Blohm und Voss military (70 percent of the product) shipyard proved to management that the enterprise could at no less profitability manufacture civil ships and desalination equipment. Even the Krupp plants in Bremen and Kiel are assembling together with Leopard tanks equipment for saving energy and assimilating alternative sources thereof.

In France the Arms de (Shatlero) firm created the Sfena division for the production of civil products. The Atelier de (Tarb) military enterprise also manufactures instruments with built-in electronic components. The explosives factory in (Ripo) has been reoriented toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the plant in (Guerni) has begun to manufacture agro-industrial equipment instead of supplies for the navy.

In Italy military contractors are producing trucks, helicopters and ambulances, and the Snia Viscosa firm is producing synthetic fibers in parallel with explosives.

In Sweden both military and civil aircraft are being assembled simultaneously on the production lines of the SAAB company. In Holland Philips has on the basis of the manufacture of radar equipment assimilated the production of transport artery safety equipment and so forth.

Of course, reverse metamorphoses, including the entry of companies which were previously civil in their profile into the military-industrial complex, are possible also. Much here depends on the correlation of military and civil government orders. But it is significant that in the event of a sincere aspiration to disarmament governments of capitalist countries may in conversion policy rely on a quite wide stratum of business circles.

The socialist countries will come to the UN conference on the interrelationship between disarmament and development with the precise and clear program set forth in the Warsaw Pact statement "On Overcoming Underdevelopment and Establishing a New International Economic Order". "Proceeding from the fact," the statement points out, "that there is a close interconnection between disarmament and development and that only disarmament can release vast additional resources for overcoming economic backwardness, the Warsaw Pact states advocate as emphatically as can be specific measures in the sphere of disarmament being accompanied by a corresponding reduction in military spending. The material, financial, human and scientific resources thus released should be used to accelerate the economic and social progress of the appropriate countries and also to eliminate economic backwardness in various parts of the world. Each step on the way to arms limitation and disarmament, specifically the elimination of nuclear arms, should result in the release of additional resources for development." "A reduction in such (military—I.I.) spending," UNCTAD experts agree with this position in their recent survey "Revitalizing Development, Growth and International Trade," which was prepared for the Seventh UNCTAD Session in July 1987, "would afford access to the huge resources necessary for an acceleration of progress in the solution of such major global problems as poverty and underdevelopment" (24).

On this platform the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are prepared for cooperation and dialogue with all states to which peace and their own economic future are dear.

Footnotes

1. "Disarmament Yearbook, 1983," United Nations, New York, 1984, p 48.
2. UN Document A/40/519, 23 August 1985, pp 215, 216, 221, 222; "Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1985," UNCTAD, New York, 1986, p 420; "Militarism. Facts and Figures," Moscow, 1985, pp 81, 215, 216.

3. See "Defence and Economy. The Issues of Jobs, Inflation and Long-Run Growth," Washington, 1983, pp 25-26; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 18 June 1980.

4. "Disarmament and World Development". Edited by M. Graham, R. Jolly, C. Smith, London, 1986, p 13.

5. See *The Economist*, 11 April 1987, pp 36, 69; M. Carnoy, D. Shearer, R. Rumburger, "A New Social Contract," New York, 1983, p 18; *The Economist*, 16 April 1987, pp 70-72.

6. "Abruestung und Umstellung der Ruestungsindustrie auf Friedenproduction," Brussels, 1983, p 11; TIME, 30 March 1987, pp 30, 31.

7. *International Herald Tribune*, 9 April 1987.

8. "Disarmament and World Development," p 15.

9. "Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1985," p 381.

10. "Report on the World Social Situation, 1985," United Nations, New York, 1986, p 19; UN Document A/40/519, p 224.

11. "Disarmament and World Development," p 69; TIME, 29 September 1986, p 22; *International Herald Tribune*, 22 September 1987.

12. W. Leontieff, F. Duchin, "Military Spending," New York, 1983, p 42.

13. "Disarmament Yearbook, 1983," p 493.

14. UN Document A/CONF.130/PC/INF/16, pp 10, 14, 19.

15. "The Eighth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries. Economic Declaration," Harare, 1986, p 4.

16. *Defence Nationale* No 10, 1984, p 14.

17. *Fortune*, 30 September 1984, pp 15, 18.

18. "Defence and Economy....," p 140; "Report on the World Social Situation," p 19; see *The Economist*, 28 March 1987, p 16.

19. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 23, p 619.

20. *Nihon Keizai*, 3 May 1987; see *New Statesman*, 5 July 1985, p 17; see *International Herald Tribune*, 24 April 1987.

21. *Alternatives* No 1, 1984, p 56.

22. See T. Fontanel, "L'economie des arms," Paris, 1984, pp 103, 97.

23. L. Nefiodow, "Politics and Innovation," Birlingshaven, 1985, p 13, tables 12, 13.

24. "UNCTAD. Revitalizing Development. Growth and International Trade," New York, 1987, p 14.

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XINHUA: U.S., USSR Urged To Take Disarmament Lead
OW151904 Beijing XINHUA in English
1842 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Text] United Nations, October 15 (XINHUA)—China today urged the two superpowers to take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons.

The appeal was made here this morning by Fan Guixiang, China's ambassador for disarmament affairs, at the general debate of the U.N. General Assembly.

While welcoming the preliminary agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the global elimination of their intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), Fan said that these INF accounted for only "a tiny portion" of their huge nuclear arsenals.

He said the two powers should drastically reduce and destroy all types of nuclear weapons deployed both at home and abroad.

He also said conventional armament is a principal arena for the global arms race between the two superpowers, and constitutes a real threat to world peace.

He warned the two powers not to take their arms race into outer space, which is the "commonwealth of humanity" and should be used for the benefit of mankind. The United States and the Soviet Union are the only countries that possess, test and develop outer space weapons.

On negotiations to conclude the convention banning chemical weapons, he said the first aim must ensure thorough destruction of the existing chemical weapons and their production facilities. He also called for the prohibition of test, production, transfer, deployment and use of new chemical weapons. Once the victim of chemical weapons, he said, China has consistently stood for "the complete prohibition" of such weapons.

END

10

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